Heien v. North Carolina (13-604)

argument 13-604

Heien v. North Carolina

Supreme Court of the United States 59 min 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central Fourth Amendment issue in Heien v. North Carolina?

John G. Roberts 0:01

Our first case this morning is Hein versus North Carolina. Mr Fisher?

Ted Olson 0:11

Mr. Chief Justice, it may it please the court. In a country dedicated to the rule of law, Governmental officers should be presumed to know the law at least as well as the citizens are. That being so, when questions about individualized suspicion arise under the Fourth Amendment, they should be addressed against the backdrop of the correct interpretation of the law, not simply any plausible reading an officer might have.

Unknown 0:35

So it suppose that uh uh this state, North Carolina, did have a good faith exception. to the exclusionary rule. What would you be arguing today?

Ted Olson 0:47

We would be still be arguing, uh, if that were the case, that the f not only the Fourth Amendment was violated, but that the good faith exception didn't apply. But you wouldn't have to reach that question in this case, and I and I would concede to you, Justice Kennedy, that would be a debatable argument. Understanding the other thing. But

Unknown 1:03

why would it be any more debatable than the argument you're making here? I I I more or less anticipated your your your answer. I think that has to be your ans I I think you have to tell us even if the good faith Exclusionary rule applies, a mistake of law just doesn't count.

Ted Olson 1:18

Well, that's not exactly what this court's jurisprudence holds, of course. In Krollin Davis, the court has held that reasonableness of mistakes of law can be taken into account at the remedy stage. And I think that would be

Unknown 1:29

w but then the question is why isn't that a problem for you? when you say there cannot be a reasonable mistake of law. We know there can be.

Ted Olson 1:37

Well there's a difference, Justice Kennedy, between rights and remedies in the court's jurisprudence. When you ask the question about what is reasonable as to whether or not the Fourth Amendment was violated, both in its fourth amendment jurisprudence in criminal cases and in qualified immunity cases, you uh do that assessment against the correct interpretation of the law. Now in Leonardo, I'm

Unknown 1:55

talking about whether as a c a as a categorical matter, as a jurisprudential matter. we can have this dichotomy known as a reasonable mistake of law and d a difficult qu and interesting question. But it seems to me that you have to make the same argument here or uh in the in in the case where they have a good faith exception as you're making here, and that you have a problem with Davis and Kroll, and if you don't have a if you have a problem with Davis and Krull then that uh under uh undermines your categorical argument.

Ted Olson 2:24

No, I really don't think so, Justice Kennedy. If I think the best exposition of this problem in the court's jurisprudence is actually in the Anderson against Creighton case, the qualified immunity case, where the court wrestled with this notion that how can something be reasonable in one sense and unreasonable in another? And the answer the court gave is that when we asked whether the Fourth Amendment was violated, We do not take mistakes of law into account, but the reason of a mistake of law can go to the remedy question. This is the premise from which Leon, Kroll, and Davis all Derive.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg 2:59

Mr Fisher, I have a preliminary question. Even if You you were right about um mistake of law. Isn't it a moot question in this case? Because as I understand it The traffic stopped. ended with a warning citation. So the traffic stop is over. And at that point The police officer asks. if he can inspect the car. And the answer is yes. Why isn't the consent to the search? The end of this case.

Ted Olson 3:40

Because it would be the fruit of the poisonous tree, Justice Ginsburg, if the stock was illegal. There would have never been an opportunity to ask for consent. And I think that's why the State and the Solicitor General haven't made any argument that the consent wipes away the Fourth Amendment question here.

Samuel A. Alito 3:54

Well suppose the officer had said W uh all right, uh I'm giving you a warning. You're free to leave now. But by the way, may we may I search your car.

Ted Olson 4:04

I th I think that's more or less what the officer did say here, Justice Salina.