Hencely v. Fluor Corp. (24-924)
argument 24-924Hencely v. Fluor Corp.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 29m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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What is the constitutional basis for preempting state tort claims against military contractors?
Argument next in case 24924, Hensley v. Flower Corporation. Mr.
Chang? Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the courts, after the Army found that Floor's disregard of key contractual requirements led to the bombing at Bagram, Specialist Hensley tried to seek some measure of justice. But the Fourth Circuit blocked his efforts on a rationale that Floor doesn't defend. Floor's alternative theories do not justify preemption here either. First, Floor argues that the Constitution's structure, either by itself or through its emanations of federal interests, preempts Hensley's claims. That argument has no basis in the Constitution's text, structure and history. Our constitution presumes that state tort claims are available and leaves it to Congress to alter that default rule.
Congress has done so in some circumstances when it comes to federal contractors, but it has not barred claims by American soldiers injured by contractor negligence. Second, FLOR seeks to radically expand boil. Boyle is a basis for reversing and not affirming the judgment. Boyle recognized a limited defence for contractors who do what the government says. Boyle doesn't apply here because the army is self found that Floor violated the Army's instructions. Floor's contrary reading of Boyle contradicts Boyle itself, and it cannot be harmonised with the warning in Rodriguez that judicial lawmaking should play a modest role. or the teaching in Garcia that preemption cannot be based on uncodified interests.
I welcome the Court's questions.
Uh did uh respondent make the constitutional arguments below?
I believe it was included uh in a small portion of their uh Appelly's brief below, Your Honor.
Uh does d uh in in your case uh Is there any portion of activity that we're talking about that was done at the direction of the military that that's involved here?
We don't think so, Your Honor. And the reason is supervision and escorting were left entirely to Floor under the contract. Once the bomber was hired and and was on the base, it was up to Floor under his contractual obligations to supervise him at his work site as well as to escort him.
And uh would you spend just uh a brief moment uh discussing why Boyle is not dispositive or why it doesn't control here?
Sure. So Boyle is all about a contractor who does what the government says. That is the heart and soul of Boyle. It starts at page five hundred oh five by saying the government's interest is in getting its work done. And at step two, it says there was a significant conflict between state tort duty and what the government required that was precisely contrary to what the government required. And at step three, Boyle made it very clear that its defence is for contractors who adhere to the government's specifications.
What do you do with the entire text and history of the Constitution which says uh war making war fighting in combat zones is a federal interest and the states, Article one, Section ten and otherwise, uh have nothing to do with uh how America conducts its operations in a combat zone.
Certainly, Your Honor. So Articles one and two do not automatically preempt uh state law when it comes to federal contractors. And we know that from cases like Pendarries and North Dakota. In Pendarries, this court said there is no clause of the Constitution which purports, unaided by congressional enactment, to prohibit such regulations, and such regulations there was regulations of of military contractors. And of course Justice Cabanot
Well in a in a war zone though, in a combat zone, um Uh we have a long a line of cases, Garramendi, Crosby, you know all the cases. Put aside Boyle. Boyle footnote four talks about this, but not Boyle the rest of it, that says that there are certain areas where there's a uniquely federal interest, uh and in those areas the usual uh preemption rules don't apply, that we expect Congress actually to speak clearly uh if they want to provide for something like state tort suits. And that's so that's flipped. And it would think if you're talking about uniquely federal interests, there's nothing that's more uniquely federal than successfully fighting a war in a combat
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the constitutional basis for preempting state tort claims against military contractors?
0:00–11:10
2
How does the argument about the Constitution’s war‑powers and the Supremacy Clause shape the case?
11:10–21:57
3
What is the role of the Boyle decision and why is it considered insufficient here?
21:57–32:55
4
How do the parties define a “uniquely federal interest” in the context of combat operations?
32:55–45:38
5
What is the proposed two‑prong test for preemption of state law claims?
45:38–56:09
6
How does the combatant‑activities exception of the FTCA factor into the analysis?
56:09–1:06:35
7
What are the policy concerns about applying state tort law to contractors in war zones?
1:06:35–1:19:38
8
What conclusions do the Justices and counsel reach about the appropriate rule?
1:19:38–1:29:58