Hewitt v. United States (23-1002)
argument 23-1002Hewitt v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 30m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the purpose of Section 403 of the First Step Act and how does it affect sentencing?
We will hear argument first this morning in Case 23-1002, Hewitt v. United States and the Consolidated Case. Mr. Kimberly.
Mr. Chief Justice, it may please the Court. After decades of urging by sentencing judges and the Sentencing Commission, Congress in 2018 enacted Section 403 of the First Step Act. The point of Section 403 was to override the deal against the United States. which called for extraordinarily harsh mandatory minimum sentences even for first-time offenders. In enacting this override, Congress had to balance two countervailing values. First, justice in sentencing, and second, finality of judgments. Congress struck the balance in 403B by making 403A retroactively applicable to offenders whose conduct predated the Act but whose cases were pending and non-final as of that date. Those for whom, quote, a sentence for the offense has not been imposed.
For at least four reasons, that language calls for application of 403A to all post-enactment plenary sentencing proceedings, including plenary resentencings following vacatur. First, a sentence that has been imposed does not include a sentence that has been vacated, because a sentence that has been vacated is treated as though it never was imposed. Second, Congress's use of the present perfect tense with the preposition as of connotes an ongoing condition. It makes no sense to say that a sentence has been imposed as of the date of enactment, but that it has since been vacated. Third, the statutory structure confirms that when Congress wishes to accomplish the objective that the amicus is defending,
It uses the past tense and a different preposition. And finally, Your Honors, the rules of statutory construction do not require the Court to turn a blind eye to common sense. Amicus's interpretation produces an anomalous result, which there is no evidence Congress intended, and it's one that is flatly contrary to its acknowledged purpose. I welcome the Court's questions. Thank you.
Would you make any distinction, or do you think there is a better argument for pre-act vacatures as opposed to post-act vacatures?
I don't think so, Your Honor. I think regardless when the vacature occurs, the upshot is that the case is pending, and it's one as to which the finality interests, which drove Congress's rejection of what had been introduced as Section 403B.2, do not attach at that point.
All right. It seems to me that the Act actually focuses more on imposition of the vacature as opposed to the vacature itself. What do you make of that argument? I think that was an argument that the dissent in the Seventh Circuit case made.
Well, Your Honor, as I understand the position of Justice Barrett in the Uriarty case in the Seventh Circuit and other courts that aligned with her position, it turned on the word imposed and the idea that imposed describes a sort of immutable historical fact. But I think there are two things to say about that. The first is the effect of a vacator is, in fact, by operation of law, by operation of a legal fiction, to undo that historical fact on a prospective basis. So at the time of application of 403B, which is at the time of resentencing, the judge has to ask whether a sentence that was imposed pre-enactment but has since been vacated, is one that has been imposed as of December 21st, 2018? And the answer to that question is no, because it has been vacated and because a vacated sentence is treated as though it was never imposed.
Well, this is, I mean, it is a fortuitous windfall for your client, right? The sentence was vacated for reasons having nothing to do with the pertinent sentence that's at issue here. Is that right? There were totally unrelated issues?
It's true, Your Honor, that the basis upon which the vacator of the sentence was entered did not have to do with the convictions on which the sentences were being reestablished.
Well, putting aside, I'm not saying that the technical nuances won't control, but sort of as a matter of substantive fairness, this is just a win-win. It's just lucky that there were those errors with respect to other unrelated issues, right?
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the purpose of Section 403 of the First Step Act and how does it affect sentencing?
0:00–12:07
2
How does the Court distinguish between sentences that were imposed before the Act and those vacated after enactment?
12:07–23:58
3
Why do the parties argue about the meaning of “has been imposed” and the present‑perfect tense?
23:58–36:45
4
What role do fairness and finality play in Congress’s balancing act for this statute?
36:45–47:27
5
How do the Justices use analogies (medals, articles, convictions) to clarify statutory context?
47:27–57:30
6
What evidence from legislative history and the sponsors’ intent supports each side’s reading?
57:30–1:08:32
7
How might the Court’s interpretation affect the size of the “universe” of eligible offenders?
1:08:32–1:20:35
8
What are the potential implications of the Court’s decision for future retroactivity and sentencing cases?
1:20:35–1:30:41