Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez (10-1542)

argument 10-1542

Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 0m 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the statutory eligibility requirement for cancellation of removal under §1229(b)(A)?

John G. Roberts 0:02

We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 10-1542, Holder v. Gutierrez and the Consolidated Case. Ms. Krueger.

Unknown 0:11

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, under Section 1229B of Title VIII, an alien who has not been a lawful permanent resident for at least five years or who has not continuously resided in the United States for at least seven years following admission in any status, is not eligible for cancellation and removal under the first prong of the statute. That is true regardless of whether the alien can show that his parents or any other third party, for that matter, did satisfy those requirements. The Ninth Circuit, alone among the courts of appeals, has recognized a rule of imputed eligibility under Section 1229B.A. That rule is wrong for at least two reasons. First of all, it is inconsistent with the plain text of the statute.

Unknown 0:56

The touchstones of eligibility under Section 1229B.A., LPR status, admission, and residence, are all terms that are defined in the INA to refer to attributes that are individual to the alien seeking relief. attributes that cannot be satisfied by a third party. But even if the statute were thought to be ambiguous with respect to this question, the Board of Immigration Appeals has interpreted the statute to mean that the alien seeking relief must personally and actually satisfy both the racial requirements. That interpretation is at the very least a reasonable reading of the statute, if not the only reasonable reading of the statute. But did it

Elena Kagan 1:34

make that determination as a legal matter? or as an exercise of its discretion. As I read its opinion, it felt that it had to come to that conclusion as a matter of law. If we were to find the statute ambiguous, where has it explained its policy decisions independent of its legal conclusions.

Unknown 2:02

First of all, Justice Sotomayor, we don't think the statute is ambiguous, and so we don't think there's any reason to go to Chevron Step 2 in this case. But if you look at the Board's decision in the Escobar in particular, I think the Board makes clear that although it thought the statutory language was clear, it also rested its decision on other considerations that are uniquely within the Board's expertise. It discussed how the imputation rule comports with the general policies of the statute, how it comports with the rule that the Board itself has recognized over time. that LPR status is something that is individual to a particular alien and that the alien seeking relief has to individually, both procedurally and substantively, satisfy the eligibility requirements.

Unknown 2:44

And it also noted that the imputation rule would create significant holes in the statutory scheme. It would mean that an individual who may not even have been eligible for admission to the United States or lawful admission for permanent residence would nevertheless receive a significant benefit that goes along with that status.

John G. Roberts 3:02

You say that you think the statute is unambiguous. But it doesn't address issues of imputation at all, does it?

Unknown 3:10

It does not address issues of imputation. It

John G. Roberts 3:11

doesn't even address it. It seems to me the best you can say is that it's ambiguous.

Unknown 3:16

Well, I don't think that a statute, as this Court has recognized, has to address every conceivable possibility in order to be unambiguous. And this statute, I think, is unambiguous in that it refers to eligibility requirements that are by their nature, as defined in immigration law, individual to a specific alien. What about there was a — wasn't there in the prior law a child domicile — a child was able to satisfy the 70-year requirement based on the parent's domicile, which was deemed to be the child's. Right. The respondents relied very heavily on three Court of Appeals cases that had interpreted the predecessor to this statute, former Section 212C, to allow imputation of a parent's domicile to a child.

Unknown 4:05

Those courts relied on the common law rule that a child's domicile follows that of his parents. And applying that rule, they allowed children to rely on their parents' domicile in the United States to satisfy the seven-year lawful unrelinquished domicile requirement in that statute.