Honeycutt v. United States (16-142)
argument 16-142Honeycutt v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
56 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What facts does the petitioner present about the $270,000 proceeds from Polar Pure?
Well your argument next in case sixteen one hundred forty two, Honeycut versus United States.
Mr.
Yunikowski.
Mr Chief Justice, and may I please the court, petitioner's brother obtained nearly two hundred and seventy thousand dollars in proceeds from the sales of Polar Pure. Petitioner obtained nothing, yet the government seeks to hold him jointly and severally liable for the entire amount. That position contradicts the text, structure, history and purpose of Section eight hundred and fifty three. The government's position boils down to the theory that even though petitioner did not actually obtain this money, he should be deemed to have obtained it because his co conspirator did, based on supposed background principles of conspiracy law. But those background principles are both inconsistent with the text of Section eight fifty three and also do not apply on their own terms.
So to begin with our textual argument, I'd like to focus on the structure of Section eight fifty three A, because Section eight fifty three A enumerates three categories of property subject to criminal forfeiture. eight fifty three A one at issue here are proceeds obtained by the illegal activity. eight fifty three eighty two addresses the instrumentalities of crime And 853A3 addresses the criminal's interest in a criminal enterprise. So we pointed out in our opening brief that really joint and several liability doesn't make a lot of sense as to 853 A two and A three, which supports the inference that it also doesn't apply to A one. And the government's brief states, somewhat surprisingly in my view, that in fact joint and several liability for co conspirators applies only as to A one and does not apply as to A
two and A three. But that position by the government really has no textual basis at all, so far as we can discern.
Take it that there's some back and forth about what's new and what's old in the government's theory. Is that part of what's changed in the government's theory or not?
Yeah that is one thing that's changed. We quote a Third Circuit case from I think two years ago where the government took the exact opposite position and in fact persuaded the Third Circuit to apply joint and several liability under A two, which is one of the reasons we put this argument in our brief. But the government's change in position, I I just cannot reconcile it with the statute at all. I mean the government's theory is that A two and A three are somehow tied to ownership, whereas A one is not. But you cannot get that out of the statute. It just literally is. Lists three categories of property, and if A two and A three are directed to ownership, then so is A one. And conversely, if the government was faithfully applying its background principles, it would apply it to all subsections of A fifty three.
I mean, under the government's theory, if one person obtains something, then they all do under A one. Identical rash reasoning would require that if one person, say, uses a car in the conspiracy, they all do, and then there's forfeiture liability for everybody. under A two. And so I just don't understand the distinction that the government is drawing here. And the fact that the government s uh feels compelled to argue one thing under A one and another under A two and A three, I think shows that this is really a form of of common law criminal liability that's not required or not authorized by the text. I just want to say one word about A three in particular, which is about criminal enterprises specifically.
That statute says that a criminal defendant forfeits his interest in only his interest in the criminal enterprise, not the value of the enterprise as a whole. That's a conspiracy specific forfeiture statute that requires the person only to forfeit the interest he obtained, which we think is just totally inconsistent with the government's theory that under A one, which says nothing about conspiracy liability, there's this hidden Pinkerton rule. So another another argument we make has to do with the rest of Section eight fifty three
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What facts does the petitioner present about the $270,000 proceeds from Polar Pure?
0:00–8:30
2
How does the government’s theory on joint‑and‑several liability differ from the petitioner's interpretation of §853A‑1?
8:30–16:29
3
Why does the petitioner argue that §853A‑2 and §853A‑3 should not support joint‑and‑several liability?
16:29–23:08
4
What role does the Pinkerton rule play in the debate over attributing co‑conspirators’ acts?
23:08–29:55
5
How might the court’s decision affect the related RICO forfeiture statute?
29:55–35:32
6
When can the government invoke §853P to seize substitute assets, and has it met those requirements here?
35:32–42:19
7
How should liability for dissipated or unavailable proceeds be allocated among conspirators?
42:19–50:05
8
What is the petitioner’s ultimate request to the Supreme Court and why?
50:05–56:54