Horne v. Department of Agriculture (12-123)
argument 12-123Horne v. Department of Agriculture
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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What is the central takings issue in Horn v. Department of Agriculture?
We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 12-123, Horn v. Department of Agriculture. Mr. McConnell.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, there's a surprising number of difficult merits questions lurking in this case, mostly involving whether there was a taking, and if so, how it should be conceptualized and valued.
Could I just stop you on a factual matter because it has confused me. As I look at the captions of the cases, there appear to be two different partnerships. One partnership, known as Raisin — doing business as Raisin Valley Farms, has Mr. Horn and his wife as the partners. Larson Valley, the producer — not the producer, the handler — has four other, the Horns plus two other people. So who owns the raisins? Isn't that the first partnership of the husband and wife? And isn't the handler a second partnership that does the business of handling?
The other two partners in Lassen were Laura Horn's parents, now deceased. But the estates
have been substituted. That's right. So isn't it two legal entities, one who owns and one who handles? One partnership produces, one partnership handles?
The Department of Agriculture did not distinguish among them.
Well, I don't care if they did or they didn't. I mean, we should know. Are they two separate legal entities?
They are separate legal entities, all effectively controlled by the same family.
Well, that's, you know, you get some limited liability by creating separate entities. So the creature who owns is one partnership, and the entity that produces, that handles, is a separate one.
I assume this is one of those difficult merits questions you were alluding to. It doesn't go to whether there's jurisdiction, but to whether the claim of a taking can be asserted by — the partnership in question, doesn't it? That's right, Justice Scalia. I don't see how it goes to jurisdiction, which is the only question before us. Well, it
does to my mind because what is the claim assuming that the producer owns — the producer entity owns the raisins? What exactly is being taken from the handlers? Is it the percentage — it can't be the raisins because they don't own them.
Well, Justice Sotomayor, I'm delighted to preview our argument on the merit
on that. What do they own? What is it that's being taken from the handler entity?
The order in this case was issued against the horns in their capacity as a handler only. So the entire fine was paid by them. None of the fine is attributable to anyone in their capacity as a producer.
All right. So go back. What was taken from them? You're saying it's just the fine? The fine is a taking? Or what was the interest that they're claiming was taken by the government? They didn't own the raisins. So they get paid a fee for handling.
So this is our position, Justice Sotomayor. I think we have to look at what is it that the Department of Agriculture attempted to take. So in the demand letter, from the Department of Agriculture addressed to the horns, they asked the horns to deliver California raisins or the dollar equivalent. So that's the fact upon which all of this case is built. Now, what is the legal significance of that, California raisins or the dollar equivalent? It is our legal position, or it will be our legal position on the merits, that when the government seeks a specific reason physical property, a REIS, or its monetary equivalent, that that is a taking of the REIS itself. And there's support for that in the precedent from this Court.
The closest case is Village of Norwood v. Baker. In this case, the city condemned a strip of land for the purpose of building a road. They tried to get out of paying any compensation by claiming that the A budding landowner would gain value. That was rejected. They were assessed a $2,000 compensation for the taking. And then the city turned around and issued a special assessment against the landowner for precisely that $2,000. The landowner came back up to this court, and this court held that it was a taking, a taking of the land. And in a subsequent case just a couple of years later, the court described this as a, quote,
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central takings issue in Horn v. Department of Agriculture?
0:02–7:49
2
How do the parties define the ownership and handling of the raisins?
7:49–16:32
3
Why does the government argue the Tucker Act does not apply to the handlers?
16:32–22:06
4
What precedent cases (Norwood, Missouri Pacific) are cited to support a taking claim?
22:06–29:49
5
How does the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling affect the merits of the case?
29:49–37:05
6
What are the capacity and just‑compensation defects raised by the petitioners?
37:05–44:32
7
Can the Horns seek relief in the Court of Federal Claims or must they stay in the USDA proceeding?
44:32–52:48
8
What relief does the Supreme Court ultimately consider—affirming, remanding, or addressing the merits?
52:48–59:23