Howes v. Fields (10-680)

argument 10-680

Howes v. Fields

Supreme Court of the United States 53 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What are the two main legal issues presented in Howes v. Fields?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument next in Case 10680, Howes v. Fields. Mr. Bursch.

Mark Bursch 0:07

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. This case raises two issues. The first is whether the right against self-incrimination requires that a prisoner always be mirandized before being interviewed in isolation about conduct that occurred outside the prison. The second is an EDPA question, whether this Court in Mathis clearly established such a per se rule. For three reasons, the answer to both questions is no. First, for nearly 50 years, this Court has declined to adopt any new per se rule that always requires a Miranda warning, instead considering all the circumstances. Lower Court. Don't you think being in custody itself is a circumstance? Sure, it's a circumstance. That goes into the all the circumstances mix.

Elena Kagan 0:55

What's all this all circumstances mix? I thought that our case law was fairly clear that all circumstances is a test for voluntariness. I thought the issue has always been under Miranda, is the person free to go or not? That's correct. We agree to the test. So since when have we imported the language of voluntariness into the Miranda test? And should we be creating yet another test?

Mark Bursch 1:23

Justice Sotomayor, they're two separate tests. And I go back just to last term. So go to the test —

Elena Kagan 1:29

of freedom to leave. MR. Yes, in — JUSTICE BREYER- If you were taken from your cell and locked into a room — and let's change the facts — MR. Yes.

Mark Bursch 1:37

JUSTICE BREYER-

Elena Kagan 1:38

And locked in a room and said, talk to me, tell me — you have to tell me what happened, is that person free to go?

Mark Bursch 1:45

MR. It would be much more difficult, but the test would be whether a reasonable person in the prisoner's position felt that they were free to go back to their cell in accord with reasonable, ordinary prison procedures. And that would be the test that's consistent with JDB. And I submit with every Miranda case that this Court has issued in the last 50 years.

Elena Kagan 2:02

All right. So what makes this case different? He's taken from a — except being told that he could leave. If he had been taken from his cell, removed from the prison, his normal setting, taken by armed guards to another building, and with guards at the door — sat down and talked to us about this incident, why would he think he was free to leave? There is one fact I'm taking out of it,

Mark Bursch 2:39

which is that he was told he was free to leave. MR. Right. There are a number of circumstances that kind of culminate in what I consider to be the two most important. Some of the background circumstances, he was in a room that was not locked. It was a conference room, not an interrogation room with a bright light. He was not shackled. He was not threatened. He was not physically harmed in any way. The two big ones are, one, that when he started to become belligerent, the guards told him that if you don't want to cooperate, then you'll have to go back to your cell. You'll have to leave. And that's the exact opposite of Miranda custody.

Elena Kagan 3:10

As I see the record, he claims twice he said, I don't want to talk to you. And when he asked to leave at the end, it took 20 minutes and they continued the question. Doesn't that counter the rest of what you're saying?

Mark Bursch 3:25

There are two factors that go into the mix, and I'll discuss each one in turn. When he says, I don't want to talk anymore, then he went on and kept talking. And you have to consider, well, why did he keep talking? Well, the record shows, I think if you're reading of it anyway, that he was trying to explain to the officers this timeline that he kept talking about. At the end, when it was a 20-minute delay, there is no contention that that was anyhow inconsistent with reasonable prison procedures. And the fact that it could have been 20 minutes, could have been 30 seconds, could have been an hour, depending on procedures, demonstrates why a per se rule doesn't make sense. We should look at all the circumstances.

Unknown 4:01

Why is a per se rule necessarily what is being argued here? For one thing, he had no choice but to go with the police, right?

Mark Bursch 4:16

That's correct.