Hughes v. United States (17-155)

argument 17-155

Hughes v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States 52 min 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal issue in Hughes v. United States?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear first this morning, Case 17-155, Hughes v. the United States. Mr. Chomsky.

Unknown 0:06

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the plurality and the concurrence in Freeman recognized two ways that a sentence following a C-type agreement can be based on the guidelines. Both are correct. Now, those opinions differed in their reasoning, such that Freeman itself has no precedential effect under Marks, but the two approaches can be united under a common umbrella, namely longstanding principles of proximate and multiple causation, and that's because each form of guidelines reliance bears a close connection to the sentence.

Elena Kagan 0:44

Mr. Chomsky, could you address one issue for me on this question? In a C agreement, the government is giving up often certain things. Sometimes they dismiss additional charges. Sometimes, as here, they give up filing a persistent felony certificate. Sometimes they agree not to prosecute someone important to the defendant. There are many things that go into that bargain. How is a district court judge to determine whether a departure from the guideline range is justified, in what circumstances is what the government given up valuable enough to keep the original deal, and when is it not?

Unknown 1:38

Justice Sotomayor, let me answer the question in two parts, if I can. First of all, those conditions, the way Your Honor describes C-type agreements, are true also for B-type agreements and for the sort of C-type agreements that the government concedes open the door to eligibility for relief under 3582C2. So this particular category of C-type agreement that the government is proposing to carve out is not different in that way than all of these other categories of agreements.

Elena Kagan 2:12

Except that let's take dismissing charges. I think it could be seen as relatively easy. How different were the charges and the exposure from what was kept and what was the strength of the government's evidence. And the government could talk about that at sentencing on those charges. But the persistent felony offender certificate is a different judgment, which is I, the government, think that a sentence of X amount justifies giving up that certificate. How would a district court make up for the loss of that belief by the government?

Unknown 2:54

Well, Justice Sotomayor, let me push back a little bit still on the first part of my answer and then get to the second part. Again, that's no different than in a C-type agreement in which there is a range defined by the guidelines and the government agrees that those sentences are eligible for relief under 3582C2. The only difference there is that rather than a number potentially moving a bit, a range will move a bit. So again, I don't think it's categorically different in that way. But to answer the second part of the question, the district court judge exercising her or his discretion will apply the 3553A factors just like they do in any other case where there is a request for discretionary relief under 3582C2.

Unknown 3:44

Remember that this is only a question of eligibility. It's not a guarantee of relief. It just enables the case ordinarily to go back to the very same district court judge who is the one who approved the agreement in the first place and determine whether under the circumstances, again, the 3553A circumstances, Some adjustment is appropriate.

Elena Kagan 4:11

When wouldn't any — what would disqualify a defendant from eligibility? The plurality said this determination has to be made on a case-by-case basis. But as I read your brief, I can't — what are the scenarios where you think someone would not be eligible?

Unknown 4:34

Let me answer again in two ways and again maybe in exactly the same two ways. This is no different than any other sentencing determination in the sense that it is predicated on the 3553A factors.

Elena Kagan 4:48

No, I'm saying we read the transcript. Government comes in under a C agreement where it says we're not recommending a guideline sentence. We want to deviate from it because we think He cooperated, but not enough to be substantial. He has an ill child, whatever the reasons are. We think a lower sentence is appropriate.