Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk (13-433)
argument 13-433Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the Court’s position on security‑screening time under the Portal‑to‑Portal Act?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case thirteen four thirty-three integrity staffing solutions versus bus. Mr. Clement?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, going through security as part of the egress process is a classic postliminary activity that is noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act. It is materially similar to the process of checking out at the end of the day or waiting in line to do so, which is a quintessential postliminary activity under the Act. The Ninth Circuit erred in treating this time as integral and indispensable to a principal activity, and respondents' position that the time is compensable without regard to whether it is an integral or indispensable activity is more problematic still.
Mr. Clemente, can I give you a high belt? Um suppose that there is an employer with cash registers. And there's a very extensive process for closing out the cash registers and that extensive process is to protect against theft. If it weren't for that concern, you could close out a cash register much more quickly. Or the same for bank tellers, or the same for casino dealers, you know, that there's like a twenty minute process which is essentially an anti theft security process. And it happens at the end of the shift when the um a cashier goes off duty. What's the difference between that case and um uh going through security in uh it at Amazon.
Well I I think one difference and it's not I'm not crystal clear that that time would not be um non compensable because I think that's sort of the winding down period which is uh I think with at least potentially within the ambit of preliminary and posteliminary activities. Do
you know, by the way, I mean b before we you get onto that, do you know how how um uh that's treated under the law? Because I guess my assumption was that this kind of period would be treated as compensable. Uh uh but if if if that's not right,
let me know. Well it's a problem with hypotheticals because I I don't know that that particular case has arisen. I would think that would be actually a close question under the Act. Because you do have this notion under the Portal Portal Act that preliminary activities and postliminary activities are noncompensable. And that, if you go back to Mount Clemens, which used the term preliminary, that included the sort of wind up process and might well include this sort of wind down process at the workstation. Couldn't
you say that closing down the cash register is part of the job? But getting yourself inspected as you leave the as you leave the the place of business is not part of the job.
You could definitely say that, Justice Scalia, and I meant to get that as the reason. You can not only say it,
it seems to me true.
All the better then to say it, um, which is that that this then becomes an easier case than that because it is part of the egress process, which is the really the process of getting from your party. But I thought part of Justice
Kagan's hypothetical was that the twenty minutes or the thirty minutes is just for anti theft purposes. The the the or at least I'll interpreter hypothetical that way. It's just for any third. Uh otherwise the cashiers or the the The the the uh records and so forth are are are turned up. But just for anti theft protection you need the twenty or thirty minute. If if I can interpret the hypothetical that way, then it seems to me uh to be the same uh
Uh I I don't think it's the same. I think it's an arguable case under the act that it still might be posteliminary, but I think if you look at the cases that are out there The courts have struggled a bit with the preliminary and posteliminary activities to take place at the workstation. Where I don't think they've struggled until the Ninth Circuit decision here is when you're talking about time after you've left the primary workstation and you're in the process of going to the doors.
Walk. from the the w with her tray to the manager's station and do the same thing there on the way out the door, there would be one answer and if she does it at the cashier station it would be another answer.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Court’s position on security‑screening time under the Portal‑to‑Portal Act?
0:01–8:02
2
How do the parties define “preliminary” and “post‑preliminary” activities?
8:02–16:25
3
Why do the advocates compare warehouse exit screenings to cash‑register close‑out procedures?
16:25–25:50
4
What is a “principal activity” and how is it distinguished from ancillary tasks?
25:50–32:39
5
Does the length of the security line affect its compensability under the Act?
32:39–40:19
6
How do drug‑testing and other mandatory health checks fit into the compensable‑work analysis?
40:19–47:32
7
What role does the “continuous workday” rule play in evaluating egress activities?
47:32–53:48
8
What conclusions does the Court reach about the exit‑screening time in Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk?
53:48–1:01:49