J.D.B. v. North Carolina (09-11121)
argument 09-11121J.D.B. v. North Carolina
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What facts about J.D.B.'s interrogation set the stage for the Miranda custody debate?
We'll hear argument next in Case 09-11-12-1, J.D.B. v. North Carolina. Ms. Blackmon?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, J.D.B. was only 13 years old when he was taken out of his middle school classroom and escorted to a closed-door interrogation conducted by outside law enforcement regarding a matter that did not take place on school property. He was isolated from his family. who had already demonstrated an interest in this investigation and sought to shield him from the police. He was not advised that he was free to leave or free not to answer questions until he had already incriminated himself. The restrictions on JDB's freedom of movement, which existed because of his youth, were heightened by the manner in which this officer chose to conduct this interrogation and the expected deference to authority figures
categorically characteristic of children were taken advantage of by the manner in which this officer chose to conduct the interrogation. JUSTICE
BREYER- Ms. Blackmun, I'm not clear on what you are proposing. Is there to be one different Miranda requirement rule for all minors, or is there to be one for What, 20-year-olds, 19-year-olds, 18-year-olds, 17, 16? This one's 13. Do we calibrate that finally? Or do we just say, you know, what would a minor, I don't know, a general minor regard as restrictions upon his departure?
Justice Scalia, what we are proposing is that the test be a court may consider age in determining whether they're a reasonable person in the juvenile jurisdiction. I
understand that. So you mean 15, 14, 13, 13
and a
half,
right? We did not suggest that it be calibrated by age, although in state court jurisdictions many of them are and are not finding that a difficult test to
perform. If not calibrated by age, how is it to be calibrated?
It is to be the exercise of recent judgment by the judge taking into account common sense. Common sense. How
is the law enforcement officer going into the confrontation going to know whether a judge is going to be applying a 15-year-old rule, a 13-year-old rule, or whatever?
Clearly, in the jurisdiction in which he practices, he should be aware of the fact that a court utilizes that type of role, but we're not suggesting that that be done. What a court is examining is relative youngness, relative oldness. Why isn't all of
that subsumed under the voluntariness rule?
As this Court has frequently recognized, the voluntariness inquiry is more difficult for courts to perform than the Miranda custody one. And you have also recognized that — But at least it's the Court
performing it, not the interrogating officer, as Justice Scalia's questions point out.
A police officer plays a role in the voluntariness also. And the police officer must be assessing whether the circumstances may be giving rise to an involuntary confession. What
about mental deficiency? If aid should be one of the factors deciding whether the individual regarded himself as in custody or not, why shouldn't mental deficiency be so as well? Is there any basis in principle for not — I mean — Once you do this, don't you in effect say that it is a subjective inquiry whether the particular individual regarded him or herself as being in custody? Isn't that the basis of what you're arguing? No. No? Why is age different for mental deficiency, for example?
Age is different because, number one, it involves restrictions on freedom of movement. So the circumstances of the interrogation are going to be understood and interpreted differently by a child than it would be by an adult. Secondly, we're talking about cognitive differences which exist between children and adults, which affects their perception and understanding. You
could say both of those things about the mentally deficient. They may regard themselves as unfree to leave, and they have cognitive deficiencies.
As far as I know, there hasn't been the recognition in the law that there is, as to children, that groups such as the mentally handicapped are unable to — Well, what about
this test, which comes from three cases, the first being Berkimer, the second Stansbury, and third, I'll tell you in a second.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What facts about J.D.B.'s interrogation set the stage for the Miranda custody debate?
0:02–7:04
2
How do the Justices argue whether age should create a separate Miranda rule for juveniles?
7:04–13:54
3
What is the proposed “objective‑circumstances” test and how might it apply to juveniles?
13:54–23:24
4
Why do some Justices prefer the traditional voluntariness inquiry over a new age‑based standard?
23:24–31:41
5
How do hypothetical scenarios (e.g., different ages, disabilities, and settings) illustrate the challenges of the proposed rule?
31:41–41:14
6
What distinctions are drawn between age, mental deficiency, and sensory disabilities in Miranda analysis?
41:14–51:00
7
How might adopting an age factor affect police practice, court workloads, and the purpose of Miranda warnings?
51:00–57:43
8
What conclusions and requests do the parties make in their closing arguments?
57:43–58:35