Jackson v. Hobbs (10-9647)

argument 10-9647

Jackson v. Hobbs

Supreme Court of the United States 46 min 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal issue being argued in Jackson v. Hobbs?

John G. Roberts 0:03

We'll hear argument next in case ten nine six four seven Jackson versus Hobbes. Welcome back.

Sonia Sotomayor 0:10

Thank you, Mr Chief Justice. And and may it please the court uh changed your mind in the Uh No, Justice Glee, I I I haven't. Um I I I I do want to c emphasize yes.

Elena Kagan 0:23

Could you start? I know that Edmund and Tyson has to do with death eligibility um with respect to um adults, but it does draw a line between death eligibility with respect to intentionality or not or recklessness. assuming, for the sake of argument, that um uh some of us might be interested in whether a line should be created for juveniles who intended or didn't intend de um uh death. with respect to their eligibility for life without parole. whether it's mandatory or voluntary. How would we write that? We would would we just import all the Edmund and Tyson jurisprudence or would we say something different with respect to Jimbal's.

Sonia Sotomayor 1:16

Well, I I think you c you could do that. In fact, in Graham the Court uh m makes these statements that they are trying to exempt and shield uh juveniles who did not kill, quote, or did not intend to kill. And that language uh could be a basis for organizing the court's thinking on this issue. And obviously in this case where there wasn't a requirement of the specific intent to kill that was required in the Alabama case that that might dictate a certain uh different outcome. I think the challenge with that is that juvenile status, juvenile intent is a much more complicated issue. And that it for many of the same reasons uh that uh are problematic uh with how kids function at the first stage of these trials, uh it'd be hard to that has to do with your general rule,

Elena Kagan 2:03

which which we shouldn't impose it. at all. But if we go even to your second step rule, something we buy for kids. Yeah, I hear then we still have the question of when do we permit a mandatory imposition. I I think

Sonia Sotomayor 2:20

there's no question, uh Justice Sotomayor, there would be more justification for those crimes where there is an intent to kill, uh, because this court in its jurisprudence has recognized that kind of hierarchy which you have outlined and is exhibited in Edmund. and then in the court's other cases. Now it's true that in er in Arkansas, under this provision, an adult would still be subject to the death penalty because they use this recklessness language so that even the focus on intent to kill that we uh address in Enmin might not categorically protect uh these uh other juveniles, which I think the Court can rightly acknowledge have diminished culpability. It's also worth noting that in many of these states where there are children being sentenced to life without parole,

Sonia Sotomayor 3:03

Uh there is no confusion about this. They are being convicted of homicide offences for which there is no intent to kill, no dispute. those uh jurisdictions, those provisions would uh likely be addressed by the enmine uh uh analysis.

Elena Kagan 3:16

Well in fact Jackson was convicted with a non intent. Just it's felony aid.

Sonia Sotomayor 3:23

Well it would s you're you're absolutely right that it's felony murder, but it's a little different. In Arkansas, if you uh uh cooperate or give aid to someone who commits a crime, even if it's not intentional, if it's a reckless indifference uh to life, uh you can be found guilty of what is capital felony murder. And the Arkansas Court has interpreted that to mean for an adult you'd be subject to the death penalty, and here control Jackson was subject to life without parole. The state argues that there was support for that and even some kind of intent because there was a dispute about uh the words. Just quickly, you know these three It doesn't

Elena Kagan 3:59

matter. The jury didn't have to all the jury found was that he didn't meet his affirmative burden of proving.

Sonia Sotomayor 4:06

That is correct. That is exactly

Elena Kagan 4:08

they didn't make a fine what words were used that what the intent was.

Sonia Sotomayor 4:12

That's exactly right. And and the dissenters at the Arkansas Supreme Court relied on that in making the determination that they did not conclude that intent had been established here in a way that would support the judgment that we seek.