Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez (19-896)

argument 19-896

Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 4m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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Does the statute require a bond hearing after six months of detention?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument first in case nineteen eight ninety six, Johnson versus Arteaga. Mr. Rayner?

Matthew G. Whitaker 0:10

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court, section twelve thirty one A six states that certain categories of non citizens, including inadmissible non citizens like responding here, quote, may be detained beyond the removal period, end quote. The question presented in this case is whether that language requires that non citizens detained under Section twelve thirty one A six be afforded a bond hearing before an immigration judge after six months of detention, at which the government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the non citizen is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. That question answers itself. Respondent implicitly recognizes the absence of any textual support

Matthew G. Whitaker 0:55

for his position on the question presented. He accordingly focuses on an altogether different issue, namely whether he is entitled to outright release under this court's decision in Zad Vitas because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable. That argument would require modifying the judgment below, which afforded respondent a bond hearing, not outright release. Because he did not file a cross petition for a writ of certiareri, that argument is not properly presented here, and this court should reject it for that reason alone. In any event, the argument is mistaken. Unlike in Zadvidas, the detention here pending a proceeding is not indefinite. It has a logical termination point, the conclusion of the proceeding.

Matthew G. Whitaker 1:36

It therefore does not trigger the Zadvitas rule. This court should reverse the judgment below. Starting with the text. Here, in order to succeed, respondent has to both rewrite the substantive standard contained in the statute as well as the procedural standard. The statute enumerates four substantive bases for I mean As an initial matter, haven't we crossed that bridge in Zadvitis? I don't think so, Mr Chief Justice. On his Zad Vitas argument it's true the court held that there's an implicit limitation in the statute that once removal is not reasonably foreseeable, detention isn't authorized. That argument isn't presented here. If the court wanted to go down that road, it would have to assess whether detention pending a proceeding is indefinite within the meaning of Zadvitus.

Matthew G. Whitaker 2:23

And Damore answers that question in the negative. But on the argument that responds to the question presented and that was decided below, he wants a bond hearing that affords him release if he's not a flight risk or a danger to the community. And that is a separate substantive standard than. Was it issue in Xavitas?

John G. Roberts 2:41

I my question is in your objections in your brief, of course, is that um uh the the provisions that are at issue here are not in the statute. Um uh and the y your your objection is that we shouldn't read read them all in. And I just wonder if we've already decided. that uh the statute can be expanded beyond its plain terms in Davides.

Matthew G. Whitaker 3:05

I don't think so, Mr. Chief Justice. In Jennings this court said that Zadvidas was not a license to read in whatever protections you think are warranted under the Constitution. And I think it's important here to distinguish between the two different parts of his claim. One is procedural. He wants uh a bond hearing before an immigration judge at which we bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Those are procedural protections that he's trying to read into the statute. But the other portion of his claim is substantive. And that doesn't involve reading something into the statute, it involves rewriting the statute. So the statute enumerates four bases for detention: inadmissibility, supportability on specified grounds, flight risk, or danger.

Matthew G. Whitaker 3:45

But according to respondent, the first two bases for detention stop at six months. And only the latter two bases continue to apply after six months. So there's a serious Clark V. Martinez problem with this approach, because he's reading the may be detained language to have different meanings as applies to different categories of non citizens covered by the statute.