Johnson v. United States (13-7120rearg)

argument 13-7120rearg

Johnson v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 0m 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the constitutional issue with the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We will hear reargument today in case thirteen seventy one twenty, Johnson versus United States. Ms. Melandez? Mr.

Ms. Menendez 0:08

President, Your Honor, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The residual clause of the violent felony definition of the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague because its text and structure do not set out with clarity what predicate offences fall within its coverage and what do not. Its vagueness is proven by this court's inability, after repeated efforts, to discern a meaningful and replicable interpretive framework that will guide lower courts.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg 0:41

Uh you are contesting only the residual clause, not the rest of the statute. So if the statute ended with um the list burglary Arsen or extortion. Or involves the use of explosives, we're not attacking any of that. It's just the residual clause. Is that correct?

Ms. Menendez 1:03

That is correct, Your Honor. And we believe, in fact, that the other portions of this statute shed some light on to why the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. For instance, the other portions of the definition tie qualification for violent felony status directly to the elements of the offense in question. The force clause requires that the use of force or the attempted use of force be an element of the offense. The burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives that your honor references are determined by reference to the elements of the offense, a categorical analysis.

Samuel A. Alito 1:38

Now I know that we are asked you to uh argue this vagueness issue, but when you were here before You didn't think that uh the statute was vague as applied to your client, as I remember your argument was it's clear that your client did not fall within the residual clause, largely because he was convicted. The the the offense that's at issue is a possession offense. And you argue that none of the uh specific offenses listed is uh is a possession offense.

Ms. Menendez 2:09

You're correct, Your Honor, that when when we were here last time we argued that it is plainly not included for the reasons you mentioned as well as others.

Samuel A. Alito 2:16

So if it's not plainly included, why do we have to get to this issue at all? Why should we reach out to decide a constitutional question?

Ms. Menendez 2:22

Certainly, Your Honor. The fact that we believe it's clearly excluded seems to be at odds at the opinion of the opinion of the Solicitor General in the United States, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and other courts. The fact that something that seems obviously not to fall within the plain definition, but is still held to fall within the plain definition by numerous courts reveals the vagueness of the residual clause.

Samuel A. Alito 2:45

We get almost every case that comes here involves a a dispute among the lower courts about what something means, about what the constitutional rule is or what the statutory interpretation should be. So the the f the the mere fact that there's disagreement about this that shows that it's unconstitutionally vague?

Ms. Menendez 3:03

This goes far beyond mere disagreement, Your Honor. I can think of no other instance in which the court has endeavored so many times in so few years to answer precisely the same question, not merely interpreting the same fourteen words, but asking each time whether a single offense satisfies those fourteen words.

Samuel A. Alito 3:21

In in in James in two thousand seven we held that the residual clause we said the residual clause is not unconstitutionally vague. In Sykes, in two thousand eleven We reaffirmed that. Can you Give me other examples of instances in which the court has overruled a constitutional holding uh that has been twice reaffirmed within a period of eight years. Has that happened frequently?

Ms. Menendez 3:53

Your Honor, I think I don't have a case at the ready for that question, but what I can say is what doesn't happen frequently is that this court has to grapple with such frequency and is still unable to create an interpretive framework. The heart of starry decisis is in part workability. Precedent that remains workable and useful, that applies guidance to the lower court deserves greater deference. And with due respect to this court's understandable hesitation,