Jones v. Mississippi (18-1259)

argument 18-1259

Jones v. Mississippi

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 27m 9 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal issue presented in Jones v. Mississippi?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We will hear argument first this morning in case number eighteen twelve fifty nine, Jones versus Mississippi. Mr. Shapiro.

Cyrus R. Vance 0:09

Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Settled law recognizes the scientific, legal, and moral truth. That most children, even those who commit grievous crimes, are capable of redemption. After Miller and Montgomery, there is no denying that the permanent incorrigibility rule is settled law. Only juvenile homicide offenders who are permanently incorrigible may be sentenced to life without parole. A paragraph in Montgomery about formal fact finding has created confusion. But it cannot mean that no determination of permanent incorrigibility whatsoever is required because that would obliterate the crux of the decision. Any rule of law requires deciding if the defendant fits within the rule. But Mississippi's courts have denied the permanent incorrigibility rule itself.

Cyrus R. Vance 1:07

And the state continues that denial in this court. In remanding this very case for resentencing. The Mississippi Supreme Court did not say a word about the permanent incorrigibility rule and affirmatively misinterpreted the law by stating that LWAP is unconstitutional if and only if The sentencing judge does not consider youth related circumstances. On remand, the sentencing judge made clear he was weighing aggravators and mitigators, not assessing permanent incorrigibility. Even under an implicit finding rule that usually assumes the judge knows the law and implicitly finds the defendant incorrigible when imposing a life without parole sentence, there is no implicit finding here. That's why Mississippi continues to dispute the permanent incorrigibility rule itself.

Cyrus R. Vance 2:03

The court should enforce settled law by remanding for an answer to the decisive question. Is Brett Jones, who committed a crime just weeks after turning fifteen, permanently incorrigible?

John G. Roberts 2:16

Uh Mr. Shapiro, um I'm having just a little trouble figuring out what exactly it is that you're looking for. I y we know it can't be a formal finding, as I think you uh indicated because of Miller and Montgomery's statements. And obviously you want more than just a hearing at which you'd have an opportunity to raise the the arguments. But what is it in the middle there? Is it just a statement on the record at some point uh during during a hearing? Um uh is it I don't know, some kind of informal hear uh finding? Uh what exactly do you do you need?

Cyrus R. Vance 2:53

On the most fundamental level, Your Honor, what we need is a sentencing judge who understands that permanent incorrigibility is the dispositive rule and determines whether the defendant fits within that rule. And there are any number of ways that it could be done. One is through words, not magic words but words, but that convey in substance the idea that the defendant is permanently incorrigible, going to commit more crimes, going to recidivate, etcetera. And the other uh one other is that usually presume an implicit finding based on the presumption that the judge knows and implies the law, and therefore that a sentence of life without parole implicitly is a determination of permanent incorrigibility, just not here, because this is within the context of a state system that does not recognize the permanent incorrigibility rule to begin with.

John G. Roberts 3:54

Well at the hearing that took place here, um The the Irreparable corruption, I guess, was the label uh they used. Uh that was certainly argued by uh uh the the Council. You know, he said uh you you have to distinguish between a juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient m immaturity and the rare offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. Uh the judge certainly referred uh uh to Miller, said he considered each and every factor that is identifiable in Miller. uh uh and concluded that the uh petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of the leniency provided in Miller. Uh I mean is the problem really just that the judge didn't quote enough passages from Miller? He certainly cited it.

Cyrus R. Vance 4:44

No, Your Honor, that's not the problem. The fundamental problem is that the judge does not appear to have understood that permanent incorrigibility is the decisive rule that he needed to apply.