June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo (18-1323)

argument 18-1323

June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo

Supreme Court of the United States 59 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗
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What precedent does the Court rely on to evaluate Louisiana’s admitting‑privileges law?

John G. Roberts 0:00
We'll hear argument this morning case eighteen thirteen twenty three June Medical Services versus Russo. And the cross petition eighteen fourteen sixty, Russell versus June Medical Services.
Ms.
John G. Roberts 0:11
Rinkelman.
Unknown 0:13
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. This case is about respect for the court's precedent. Just four years ago, the court held in Whole Women's Health that the Texas Admitting Privileges Law imposed an undue burden on women seeking abortions. The Louisiana law at issue here, Act 620, is identical to the Texas law and was expressly modeled on it. After a trial, the district court ruled Act six twenty unconstitutional, finding no material differences between this case and whole women's health. On burdens, it found that Act 620 would leave Louisiana with just one clinic and one doctor providing abortions. At the same time it found that Act six hundred twenty would do nothing for women's health.
Unknown 1:04
In reversing the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit committed two fundamental errors. First, it usurped the role of the district court and disregarded nearly all of its factual findings. Second, the Fifth Circuit accepted legal arguments that this court rejected four years ago. Нах, да востифа суч улегал абфайс. In fact, even more medical organizations have joined the AMA and ACOG to say that admitting privileges impose barriers to abortion with no benefit to patients, and that this impact is not state dependent. Finally, the state's eleventh hour objection to third party standing runs up against still more binding precedents. The court squarely held in Craig versus Boren
Unknown 1:57
that such objections are waivable. And the state deliberately and strategically waived the issue in the district court. And even if the state could get past waiver, denying standing here would contradict decades of this court's precedent in numerous areas of the law. In short, petitioners have third party standing, especially because Act six twenty restricts abortion by regulating them rather than their patients. Could you have done anything different if it had been If the third party standing had been timely raised? Your Honor, we certainly could have submitted additional evidence in the court, but we believe that the evidence that is already there is sufficient to find third-party standing. This court has squarely found third-party standing in at least four abortion cases that are on point, as well as a number of other cases such as Meyer, Craig.
Unknown 2:53
Carrie. And the court's cases have been consistent in saying that a plaintiff who is directly regulated by a law has third party standing.
Samuel A. Alito 3:02
Would you agree with the general proposition that a party should not be able to sue, ostensibly to protect the rights of other people, if there is a real conflict of interest between the party who is suing and those whose rights the party claims to be attempting to defend?
Unknown 3:23
No, Your Honor, not if that party is directly regulated by the law in question. And in fact, this court has allowed third party standing in cases where the state argued that the third parties were protected by the law and in a sense protected from the plaintiff's. Really
Samuel A. Alito 3:37
that's amazing. You think that if the plaintiff actually has interests that are directly contrary to those of the those individuals on whose behalf the plaintiff is claiming to sue, nevertheless that plaintiff can have standing.
Unknown 3:53
If the plaintiff is directly regulated by the law, this court has allowed an attorney to bring third party claims against a statute that capped attorneys' fees in favor of clients.
Samuel A. Alito 4:02
Well that's amazing. What's I mean I I Suppose I know you think that the uh admitting privileges requirement serves no safety purpose, but suppose that the regulation that was being challenged was one that a lot of people might think really did serve a safety purpose. Let's say we're in a state where uh physicians' assistants can perform abortions, and an abortion clinic wants to challenge the training requirements for physicians' assistants. It just thinks those are too onerous and there's no justification for them.

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