Kahler v. Kansas (18-6135)
argument 18-6135Kahler v. Kansas
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is Kansas’ proposed change to the insanity defense and why does it matter?
We'll hear argument first this term in case number 1861-35, Collier v. Kansas. Ms. Schrupp.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, for centuries criminal culpability has hinged on the capacity for moral judgment, to discern and to choose between right and wrong. The insane lack that capacity. This understanding of insanity has persisted since the 1500s and remains the rule in 48 jurisdictions today. But Kansas scrubs moral capacity from its criminal law and runs afoul of the 14th and the 8th Amendments. Kansas rewrites history in two ways. First, by elevating the wild beast test, one that was never used in this country and only rarely in England. And secondly, by conflating common law intent, which required a vicious will and was bound up in moral capacity, with what it applies today, a morality-free modern mens rea.
As such, Kansas uproots the deeply rooted by eliminating any mechanism to assess whether a defendant's capacity for moral judgment was intact or was irretrievably compromised by mental illness. Now, I'd like to turn briefly to due process first and explain why the moral capacity notion is and always has been fundamental in our system. The model penal code is an excellent example. As criminal law evolved, the drafters moved to more precise mental states. When they did that, though, they retained the compelling mechanism to show insanity. We could do that, the drafter said, because we kept this, this narrow remnant of common law criminality. Thank you. In Clark II, this court recognized both the presumption of sanity and that evidence of insanity trumps mens rea.
This demonstrates the continued need for a mechanism to rebut the presumption of sanity, even when, even though a defendant harbors the requisite mental state. And it was not only the mechanism that was important in Clark, the substance was too. This court said Arizona could do that. It could eliminate the first part of the McNaughton test because it kept this, the right and wrong principle that subsumes it. So I'd like to now turn back to history because
it can- Before you do that, you were relying on due process. And suppose a state decides it wants to rethink the insanity defense. It looks to other nations for models. And one is what's known as a judgment of guilty but insane. That is, two determinants are made. Did the defendant- Do the act with which he is charged, that's the first question. And the second question is, what is the proper incapacitation? So guilty but insane would lead to incapacitation in a mental institution. Guilty and not insane would lead to incarceration in prisons. Would such a scheme, if adopted by a state of the United States, violate due process?
Yes, it would, Justice Ginsburg. And I think it would because the conviction itself carries collateral consequences. And we have never, as a country, treated the insane as culpable. And that conviction would impose collateral consequences on that insane person who really should be excused.
But I would have thought You would want collateral consequences imposed, as I understood your submission, because the idea is that someone acquitted by reason of insanity would not go free but would instead be committed to mental care.
Yes, that's right, Your Honor.
But — Well, why wouldn't that, if that's the consequence of the system Justice Ginsburg was talking about, guilty but insane? I don't understand why that's not exactly the sort of course you're looking for.
Well, I want to rewind a little bit, Your Honor, because really what we're talking about is the mechanism to be able to show that you lack moral capacity. The back end of it, as long as you have the mechanism to show that you lack moral capacity, that you can choose right from wrong or can't do that, then the ultimate result is not all that determinative. If guilty but insane means that you... If you end up in exactly the same place, then I suppose the label doesn't matter. But what I'm nervous about, actually, is if you have a guilty but insane, some of those statutes in some jurisdictions are you're guilty, you go and get treatment, and then once you
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is Kansas’ proposed change to the insanity defense and why does it matter?
0:00–8:28
2
How does the historical “right‑and‑wrong” test differ from Kansas’ “wild‑beast” test?
8:28–16:41
3
Why do the Justices argue that due‑process requires a mechanism to show lack of moral capacity?
16:41–22:56
4
What hypothetical scenarios illustrate the conflict between legal guilt and moral insanity?
22:56–30:30
5
How might Kansas’ approach affect collateral consequences and sentencing, especially the death penalty?
30:30–38:38
6
What do the parties say about the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on punishing the insane?
38:38–45:34
7
How do the Justices view the role of juries versus legislators in defining insanity defenses?
45:34–54:27
8
What is the final argument about whether Kansas’ law violates a constitutional floor of moral culpability?
54:27–1:01:53