Kansas v. Glover (18-556)

argument 18-556

Kansas v. Glover

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 1m 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the Court’s definition of reasonable suspicion in traffic stops?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll

General Krauss 0:00

hear argument next in case eighteen five fifty six, Kansas versus Glover. General Krauss? Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Reasonable suspicion is a minimal standard. It permits a brief investigation upon an officer's objective and particularized suspicion. Common sense judgments and inferences about ordinary expenses experiences are the touchstone of reasonable suspicion. Here, Deputy Mayor found a vehicle on the road. learned that the registered driver was incapable of lawfully operating that vehicle? Had the belief that under common sense, the registered owner was likely the driver, pulled the vehicle over, initiated the stop, cited the individual for being a habitual violator.

General Krauss 0:42

That common sense belief that Deputy Mayor had is one that has been recognized by the judges in twelve state Supreme Courts, four circuit courts of appeals across the country, and that is that finding uh the registered owner of the vehicle as a driver is a common sense information. Inference, absent information to the contrary. Some may argue that the existence of a suspended license would undermine that suspicion, but the of the sixteen courts that I just mentioned, 11 of them have dealt with this precise situation, and the judges of those courts have indicated that reasonable suspicion continues to exist even in that circumstance. Indeed, the factual predicate for the habitual violator law across the country is that.

General Krauss 1:22

The registered owner may be continuing to drive. And the only thing we're asking here is whether or not there is reasonable suspicion to investigate further. Here, Deputy Mayor relied upon uh that common sense understanding that a registered owner, given the pervasiveness of automobile use in the United States, was likely to be driving again, warranted additional investigation. To borrow a phrase from Terry, it would have been poor police work for Deputy Mayor not to initiate the uh stop in this case and investigate further to confirm or dispel his suspicion. At this point I would invite any questions from the Court. Mr.

Sonia Sotomayor 1:57

Krauss, um Many of those cases that you referenced involved at least an officer who testified. speaking about in his experience, drivers tend to be owners. We don't have anything like that here. We have a we have an officer who said he assumed that. And th that's a pretty unusual you're asking us to make an inference about facts when there are no facts in the record at all. Zero. What do we do about that?

General Krauss 2:27

So to the contrary, we believe that the stipulations are the facts. Well the

Sonia Sotomayor 2:31

stipulation, as I understand it though, is the officer said he assumed.

General Krauss 2:35

Yes. So we don't

Sonia Sotomayor 2:36

we don't have any in my experience Not no nothing.

General Krauss 2:43

First of them i is with regard to the stipulations. The parties have stipulated as to what the relevant facts were. If they believe there was information Absent from those facts, they they could have and would have done that. I think this court's cases have recognized, I believe it was the uh Christian legal society. Maybe I'm not

Sonia Sotomayor 2:58

being clear what I'm what I'm getting at. Um in in most cases, officers have testified that in my experience, so we have some factual basis for a judge to then make a legal conclusion that the officers stop was reasonable. Yeah. Here we don't have any facts from the government, from the officer about experience or realities on the ground, and yet you're asking the judge to make a legal conclusion about certain facts on the ground that are not present in the record. It's almost like a um judicial notice of facts not in record.

General Krauss 3:35

Well Is that

Sonia Sotomayor 3:36

a thing?

General Krauss 3:36

So w what I what I would uh agree with is that there is no evidence or testimony as to the h history and experience of this officer. Rather we know that he is a certified law enforcement officer, and none of the cases that I've uh found have relied upon an officer's understanding of uh whether or not a registered owner is frequently the driver. Rather, the courts have indicated as a matter of common sense and ordinary human experience that the registered owner is a is likely the driver.