Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States, ex rel, Carter (12-1497)

argument 12-1497

Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States, ex rel, Carter

Supreme Court of the United States 59 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the core dispute over the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act in this case?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next in case twelve fourteen ninety-seven, Kellogg Brown and Route Services versus United States ex-Rel Benjamin Carter.

Unknown 0:09

Mr. Elwood, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court, by clearing the way for relator to file a fifth identical false claims act complaint against KBR, raising allegations the government had long known from other sources, the court below erred in two respects. First. The plain text and la and history of the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act confirm that it applies exclusively to crimes. The language of the provision Uh tolls limitations period l limitations periods for offenses. At the on the very day that that provision went into effect, a neighboring provision or a nearby provision of Title eighteen divided offenses into two categories, felonies and misdemeanors, both plainly applying to crimes.

Unknown 0:52

A neighboring provision uh also of Title eighteen divided the offenses between capital offenses and non capital offenses. Again uh uh referring solely to crimes. And it is very telling that in in eight hundred and fifty seven dual column pages of Title eighteen, neither the government nor relator has been able to identify any provision that uses the word offence to refer to a civil violation. Is it unusual that a criminal statute of limitations would be much longer than a civil statute of limitation wh which is the effect of of your argument? I I don't think there is necessarily. I mean it depends on what exactly uh Congress is trying to attempt and it it it reflects some of the differences between the how criminal law is prosecuted and civil law is prosecuted.

Unknown 1:35

Because recall um that uh Congress did it has its separate provision for uh recognizing that the False Claims Act may be hard to investigate at times, and it provided a discovery mechanism there that doesn't apply to relate to It only applies to the government, a three-year discovery period with a ten-year backstop.

Elwood 1:53

Like some states used to have uh Uh no statute for for murder. And yet had a a statute of limitations on uh wrongful death claims. I think that's That's the case. With respect to state law anyway.

Unknown 2:10

Um but uh I I think it all kind of reflects the kind of differences between criminal law and civil law, because uh the minute a complaint is filed, I mean most of the inv investigation, especially for relators, they don't have any legal status to conduct investigations. They don't they can't bring subpoenas. So usually it's based on their own knowledge, they file a complaint, they come into court, and then they have the federal rules. Also at that point, uh the government gets sixty day Period to investigate, which is on average 13 months, according to the Chamber of Commerce brief that cites a letter from the DOJ to the Senate. And in our own experience, and in this case, is usually a couple of years.

Unknown 2:48

And during that time, they have you know all the time they want to investigate. So I think it just reflects the fact that criminal litigation and civil litigation are conducted differently. But clearly, Congress already contemplated. how to handle delays under the False Claims Act and they've enacted a civil provision for that under the FCA. And so I don't think the Court needs to import in uh this general provision, which applies only to offenses, to address the False Claims Act situation that Congress has already specifically addressed. Now all parties agree that the Wartime Suspension Act began its life as a criminal provision and exclusively and explicitly criminal provision. The only question is whether Congress changed it along the way to make it civil.

Unknown 3:30

The thing that the relators point to is the deletion in 1944 of the words now indictable. But that went unremarked in Congress, and you would expect somebody to say something if they were fundamentally transforming the nature of the statute. And that's not what people understood those words now indictable to mean at that time. If you look at um uh if you look at the other things that were around it at the time, like for example, 47 days after the first wartime suspension act was enacted, Congress uh for crimes, and all agree it was for crimes, they also enacted an antitrust suspension act, which didn't use the word offenses, it used the word violations.