Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Co. (10-1491)
argument 10-1491Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Co.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What is the core legal question about corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute?
We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 10-1491, Geoble v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. Mr. Hoffman.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the principal issue before this Court is the narrow issue of whether a corporation can ever be held liable for violating fundamental human rights norms under the Alien Tort Statute. Under respondents' view, even if these corporations had jointly operated torture centers in with the military dictatorship in Nigeria to detain, torture, and kill all opponents of Shell's operations in Ogoni, the victims would have no claim.
But, counsel, for me, the case turns in large part on this. Page 17 of the Red Brief says, ''International law does not recognize corporate responsibility for the alleged offenses here.'' And one of the meekest briefs for Chevron saying, no other nation in the world permits its court to exercise universal civil jurisdiction over alleged extraterritorial human rights abuses to which the nation has no connection. And in reading through the briefs, I was trying to find the best authority you have to refute that proposition. Or are you going to say that that proposition is irrelevant?
Well — There are a couple of questions within that. It involves your whole argument, of course. It does, yes. And let me start by saying that the international human rights norms that are at the basis of this case for the plaintiffs, crimes against humanity, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial executions, all of those human rights norms are defined by actions. They're not defined by whether the perpetrator is a human being or a corporation or another kind of entity. And so I think that the respondents are wrong when they say that international law does not extend to those kinds of acts. It does. And the United States agrees with that position. What they have tried to conflate is the question about whether international law
the international law norms apply to a corporation or a person, with whether there's an international consensus with respect to how those norms should be enforced, particularly within domestic civil jurisdiction as opposed to criminal jurisdiction.
But in the area of international criminal law, which is just analogous, I recognize, there is a distinction made between individuals and corporations?
Well, there's a distinction made within the jurisdiction of certain modern international criminal tribunals. And respondents take their position too far on this because what they've said is that the fact that corporations can't be found liable criminally under the International Criminal Court, for example, means that the norms, the underlying norms, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes when it comes to the International Criminal Court don't apply to corporations. And that clearly is wrong because the United Kingdom and Netherlands, for example, the two home countries of these corporations, has passed domestic implementing legislation that imposes criminal penalties for violations of those very norms.
So there's no question that it can be done. But what the most important — I think one of the most important principles in this case is that international law, from the time of the Founders to today, uses domestic tribunals, domestic courts and domestic legislation as the primary engines to enforce international law.
JUSTICE
GINSBERG.
Mr. Hoffman, I thought that Justice Kennedy asked you, is there another nation that has a counterpart to 1350 that imposes civil liability on corporations for violations of customary international law where the conduct occurred abroad, the harmed person is abroad, and the defendant is not a U.S. resident?
JUSTICE BREYER- Well, the — there are two parts to my answer to that. The Alien Tort Statute is a unique way of enforcing the law of nations in terms of the way that the founders married tort law and violations of the law of nations. In the International Human Rights amicus brief, the amicus brief of international human rights organizations at pages 18 to 22, there's a whole series of cases where the domestic courts and domestic legislations
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the core legal question about corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute?
0:01–9:54
2
How do the Justices frame the issue of international law versus domestic enforcement?
9:54–19:15
3
Why is the distinction between corporate and individual liability critical in this case?
19:15–25:54
4
What arguments are made about extraterritoriality and where the claim could be filed?
25:54–32:16
5
How does the debate over the TVPA and its relationship to the ATS shape the case?
32:16–38:51
6
What historical precedents (e.g., Nuremberg, IG Farbe) are cited to explain corporate responsibility?
38:51–45:50
7
How do the parties address the role of aiding‑and‑abetting and respondent‑superior liability?
45:50–54:03
8
What is the Court’s ultimate reasoning for rejecting (or accepting) corporate liability under the ATS?
54:03–1:01:31