Kloeckner v. Solis (11-184)

argument 11-184

Kloeckner v. Solis

Supreme Court of the United States 59 min 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the constitutional basis for district‑court jurisdiction over mixed discrimination cases?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-184, Kleckner v. Salas. Mr. Schnapper.

Mr. Schnapper 0:07

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the first sentence of Section 7703B2 provides that district courts have jurisdiction over all mixed cases, and that provision is largely dispositive here. The second sentence of Section 7703B2, on which the government relies, is a statute of limitations, and it doesn't limit the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. That subsection is set out at pages 16A to 17A of the government's brief. The first sentence provides that for a described category of cases, they are to be, quote, filed under one of the listed federal anti-discrimination statutes. As this Court pointed out in Elgin, all of those are statutes which authorize jurisdiction and claims in district courts.

Mr. Schnapper 1:01

Indeed, in Title VII and the ADEA. That is the only Federal Court which is authorized to hear the cases.

Unknown 1:09

JUSTICE KAGAN. Mr. Schnapper, could you clarify what the district court, as you see it, does? Does it deal only with the discrimination claim or does it deal with the MSPB's procedural ruling?

Mr. Schnapper 1:31

With regard to the — when the case gets to the district court, there may be two substantive claims, a discrimination claim and a CSRA claim. Your question, I take it, is about the form. Our view is that the claim is filed and pled, as indeed it was pled in this case, as a discrimination case, in this case under several different statutes. And the complaint here reads very much like an ordinary discrimination complaint. The government may raise — that that sort of procedural issue as an affirmative defense, and it would be free to do so here. And that happens on a number of occasions. For example, if there were a case in which the plaintiff had not, as required by the regulations, appealed to the MSPB within 30 days of the receipt of the agency decision, the government could move to dismiss

Mr. Schnapper 2:25

that claim on what the lower courts call exhaustion grounds, and the lower courts have repeatedly sustained those motions. But that's a term of defense.

John G. Roberts 2:35

MR. But the critical point, I gather, is what standard of review the district court will apply to that exhaustion question or the bar question, right? I assume you think that the standard review in the district court is going to be more favorable to your client than the standard, the arbitrary and capricious standard that would be applicable in the Federal Circuit?

Mr. Schnapper 3:00

I guess — When it's come up, Your Honor, it has generally been a question of law, like whether a 30-day rule had applied. If you had something that was — if there were a factual issue, our contention is under Section 7703 , factual issues have to be decided in NOVA. JUSTICE

Unknown 3:22

GINSBERG. Why don't we take this very case where the MSTV said that the claim was time-barred. So the government would raise it as an affirmative defense.

Mr. Schnapper 3:38

And the first question would be whether it's an affirmative defense at all. And our position would be that it is not. Not everything that could go awry in the internal procedure is an affirmative defense. One of the central principles of the 1972 amendments to Cital 7 was to create an exhaustion regime which is precise, simple, and short.

Elena Kagan 4:01

Counselor, can I back you up a minute to join the two questions that my colleague pose to you. Let's assume there's a merits-based decision on the CSRA and one on the discrimination. In the normal course, assuming you're not barred by being untimely, you could go to the district court and the district court presumably would have jurisdiction if one is a discrimination-based decision to decide both questions. What's the standard of review for that a court would apply to each of those claims independently or together. I mean, that's

Unknown 4:45

—

Elena Kagan 4:47

We can then fight about whether the factual issue regarding the timeliness and exhaustion should be subject to one or the other standard of review. But what are the standards of

Mr. Schnapper 4:59

review? They are different. The discrimination claim is dealt with de novo by the intent of Congress was that it would generally be treated like a private discrimination claim.