Knick v. Township of Scott (17-647rearg)
argument 17-647reargKnick v. Township of Scott
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 3m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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What is the central takings‑law question presented in Nick v. Township of Scott?
We'll hear argument first this morning, case seventeen six forty seven, Nick versus the Township
of Scott, Pennsylvania. Mr Bremer. Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The critical issue in this case is this. When is an invasion of property without just compensation in violation of the just compensation clause so that a property owner can claim an unconstitutional taking requiring damages? The understanding adopted well before Williamson County and Dow and other cases is that the invasion itself gives rise to a constitutionally rooted claim for compensation, unless As in Cherokee Nation, the government recognizes the owner's entitlement to compensation and provides a process for collecting it at the time of the invasion. This is the understanding that controls and taking cases against the United States under the Tucker Act
And there's no reason why we should have a different constitutional interpretation of the Just Compensation Clause simply because the defendant is a local government entity. But in fact, Williamson County does adopt a conflicting and anomalous and mistaken interpretation of the Just Compensation Clause and holding that an invasion of property is not without compensation and not actionable under the Takings Clause until State remedies are exhausted. A basis for this understanding is this court's decision, the initial basis is the Great Falls Manufacturing Case. This is 1884. And in that case, this court said that when a property owner has their in v property invaded, they are entitled from that moment to go seek compensation on a constitutional basis.
The question is whether or not to overrule Williamson County. And your assumption thus far has been that it turns solely on when you have a complete violation of the Constitution and should be able to proceed at that point. But is it necessarily the case that the same rule has to apply with respect to the Federal proceedings and a State Court proceeding? I mean, maybe what we are looking at is not something as grand as when the constitutional violation is uh has come to fruition, but instead simply a rule about how those cases should be handled in State Court uh as opposed to Federal Court. Williamson County has what I think of as a special rule for State Court proceedings that requires obviously to go to the State Court, and I am just wondering if you can address that on its own without
issuing some ruling about when a taking clause is complete and and actionable.
I don't think so because the only basis for that Williamson County scheme, state revenue scheme, is an interpretation of the just compensation clause when you have a complete claim. There's no other basis for that. And so if you have a complete claim, as you do in the claims against the United States under Dow, if you have a complete claim federal claim, well then you have a federal question and you have the option to go to federal court under section 1983. That's the purpose of section 1983 as you know. So I don't see how you I don't think the Fifth Amendment varies depending on what court you're in or what you're defending in. I think the just compensation clause has to be interpreted the same way in both of those circumstances.
And there's no other basis for saying well state courts should have it first First, that's that's the no exhaustion doctrine uh in Monroe and other cases that this court has rejected.
How does the Court’s historic understanding of the Just Compensation Clause differ from the Williamson County rule?
How does it work? I mean I'm having trouble understanding them. Uh we have a uh an environmental agency, a state environmental agency, which has some kind of a rule only So much lead can be put into the sea or air or something every mile. Now there are dozens of pieces of property. within that area. and depending upon the reasonable expectations. of individual property owners. It might violate some. Emit might not violate others. The state also has a system of courts that where there's a violation they pay. Okay. So EPA state But what are they supposed to do? I mean, uh how do we decide which ones are right and which ones are wrong?
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central takings‑law question presented in Nick v. Township of Scott?
0:00–3:27
2
How does the Court’s historic understanding of the Just Compensation Clause differ from the Williamson County rule?
3:27–7:05
3
When does a property‑owner’s claim for just compensation become actionable under the Fifth Amendment?
7:05–14:02
4
Why do the parties argue that state‑court exhaustion should (or should not) be required before filing a federal claim?
14:02–19:40
5
What practical problems arise for municipalities when a regulation may constitute a taking?
19:40–28:35
6
How might Congress or the Supreme Court resolve the conflict between the Tucker Act and §1983 takings claims?
28:35–45:55
7
What are the arguments for and against overruling Williamson County in this case?
45:55–58:31
8
What conclusions does the Court reach about the availability of a federal takings remedy for state actions?
58:31–1:03:33