Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp. (10-879)
argument 10-879Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.
Supreme Court of the United States
47 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What is the purpose of the Locomotive Inspection Act and how does it relate to railroad safety?
We'll hear argument next this morning in Case 10-879, Kearns v. Railroad Friction Products Corporation. Mr. Frederick.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Congress enacted the Locomotive Inspection Act to ensure the safety of locomotives in use on railroad lines, not to regulate hazards to mechanics conducting repairs of locomotives. The doctrine of implied —
What do you make? of the ICC in 1916 in the Tiller case, regulating the lights that railroads had to have, locomotives had to have in the yard, and that those lights had to differ when the railroad was in use.
That was actually, I think, pursuant to the Safety Appliance Act, Justice Sotomayor, if I'm not mistaken. And the principle behind the safety in use regulation that this Court construed in Napier was to ensure that locomotives were safe for fit use on the line. And that was the consistent construction both in the ICC's statement that it made in 1922 — And in this Court's postnatal — I'm not sure I understand. It
prescribed different lights when the locomotive was in the yard. Yes. It had nothing to do with safety and use. It had to do with safety and repair.
Our position is that it was not pursuant to the Locomotive Inspection Act. that the ICC promulgated that rule. As the Court has said in numerous cases, the ICC had rules in place with respect to different aspects of the train at different points in time, but the Locomotive Inspection Act was designed to address a very specific problem, which was boilers exploding on the line when the train was in operation. And that is the consistent way that the ICC and subsequently the Federal Railroad Administration. Distinguish
for me our reasoning in the Ray case. I'm sorry? Distinguish for me the reasoning in the Ray case that had to do with navigation and where we held that the agency in ensuring safety and navigation controlled design completely. whether in repair or not. So why don't we apply the logic of Wray to this case?
Well, of course, in Wray, you address the Port and Taker Safety Act as well as the Port and Waterway Safety Act. And in the United States v. Locke case, the Court subsequently looked at Wray in terms of design in a statute that also specifically included the word repair and and maintenance, which is absent here. But what the Court was getting at in Wray was to ensure that States were not using their law to interfere with the design of equipment. Of course, that was for — MR. That's the argument here, which
is once you regulate what the design or use of asbestos is, you're interfering with what available components there are for locomotives.
If I could make two points about that, Justice Sotomayor, that's not actually correct. The first is anything that the Court might think about design does not impair our failure to warn claims which entail no challenge to the design of a locomotive at all, only to the instructions for its safe use. But to the extent you're giving up all your other claims? No. My second argument is that the design claim here involves repair worker problems uniquely. It does not include or intrude on the fitness for service standard that this Court announced in Napier or that has consistently been applied. The asbestos harms that the repair workers here face are unique to the repair process, where they are scraping
off the asbestos. The power that Justice Brandeis said was conferred in that case was to specify the sort of equipment to be used on locomotives, right?
Yes.
So this is equipment that was used in locomotives.
Yes. But, Mr. Chief Justice, it also says on page 612 that the power delegated by Congress was is to determine fitness for service.
So the word is about — That's the same thing. I'll give you that, fitness for service. No,
it's not
— It doesn't say something that's going to cause harm while it's actually being used.
But, Mr. Chief Justice, the principle here is to ensure that the locomotives, when they are outside the repair yard and are on the railroad line — are safe to operate. That standard and Napier had coordination
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the purpose of the Locomotive Inspection Act and how does it relate to railroad safety?
0:01–6:06
2
How does the Court distinguish the Napier decision from the Ray case regarding design and repair issues?
6:06–12:30
3
Why do the parties argue that failure‑to‑warn claims should not be preempted by the LIA?
12:30–20:46
4
What is the significance of the “use versus repair” distinction for preemption analysis?
20:46–27:13
5
How might a state‑level asbestos warning requirement affect locomotive manufacturers?
27:13–34:27
6
Can the Federal Railroad Administration regulate safety in repair shops under the FRSA?
34:27–40:13
7
What arguments are presented about the scope of field preemption under Napier today?
40:13–45:10
8
How does the Court view the balance between federal preemption and state workplace safety regulations?
45:10–47:50