Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis (24-304)
argument 24-304Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis
Supreme Court of the United States
2h 15m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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Transcript
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What are the two basic legal principles the counsel relies on to frame the case?
We will hear argument next in case twenty four three oh four, Laboratory Corporation of America
versus Davis. Mr. Francisco?
Mr.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Two basic principles resolve this case. First, a class action is just a tool for aggregating claims. So if an individual plaintiff doesn't have Article three standing to bring his own claim, He can't bring it as part of a class either. That's why Lerau held that an intervener has to show Article three standing in order to intervene. And as Justice Scalia said in Shady Grove, class actions are just another species of joinder. Second, Rule twenty three B three's predominance requirement leads to the same result. If a class is defined to include plaintiffs without Article three standing, And as a result, you need thousands of mini trials to separate the wheat from the chaff.
The Article three issue necessarily swamps any common ones. This case is a perfect example. Plaintiffs who don't want to use kiosks don't have standing to challenge how kiosks work. any more than a vegan has standing to challenge how a restaurant defines a medium rare steak. As a result, the court needs to assess whether the each of the eight thousand to one hundred and twelve thousand class members actually want to use kiosks, and that will necessarily swamp any common issues as the DC and First Circuits correctly held in the Rail Freight and Askal cases. Plaintiff's only response is to say that courts should assess the merits first and jurisdiction second. But that makes no sense. What if they lose on the merits?
Either the unnamed class members are bound by a judgment regardless of whether the Court had Article three jurisdiction over it. Or the Court has to determine if it had jurisdiction over each plaintiff in the first place. That's why courts have to address the jurisdiction before the merits, just like in every other case. Plaintiff's rule in contrast assumes either they win or coerce a settlement. But there's no basis for that heads I win, tails you lose approach to Article three. I welcome your questions.
Uh the in this case, uh there have been a number of orders, uh and it seems as though the one that we have before us is the May order, which is in operative. Uh would you spend a minute uh on why we still have we have jurisdiction over the May order when there have been subsequent orders? Sure.
Your Honor, for a variety of reasons. I think the simplest way to understand it is that the Ninth Circuit resolved the question presented in this case, affirmed the certification of the class against us. It just got it wrong. You have jurisdiction to review that judgment. Now I can unpack that a little bit more. Everybody here agrees that the May order is before the court. August order didn't change the May order in any material way. That's what the district court explicitly found. That's what plaintiffs argued to the district court below. That's why we couldn't have actually appealed the August order even if we wanted to. It would have been barred by 23F's fourteen day statute of limitations. And I think more importantly, that is precisely why the Ninth Circuit resolved the question presented.
in the context of the May Order. It issued a judgment. That judgment went against us. It had reasoning. We think that reasoning is wrong. This court has the jurisdiction to address that judgment, reverse it, and send it back to the circuit. Council.
You're you're skipping a lot of steps in there. The May order is before us. But it's inoperative. The August order superseded it and replaced it. That's what the ninth circuit said. when it reached the May order it said you didn't move to amend your notice of appeal. Um we're basing this on the May order. We're not ma basing it on the August order. Because you didn't Uh move to amend. Isn't us looking at the May order? That's not the operative language right now. Isn't it an advisory opinion? Not
at all, Your Honor, for a couple of different reasons.
You started by saying they are identical. I don't see them as identical.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What are the two basic legal principles the counsel relies on to frame the case?
0:00–9:38
2
How does the argument address the differences between the May and August orders?
9:38–22:20
3
Why does the counsel argue that Article III standing and Rule 23(b)(3) must be resolved at the certification stage?
22:20–47:18
4
What procedural questions arise about appealing the certification orders and the applicable timing rules?
47:18–1:06:50
5
Why does the presence of uninjured class members matter for Rule 23 and Article III jurisdiction?
1:06:50–1:23:52
6
How do the parties argue about the May order versus the August order and whether the case is moot?
1:23:52–1:40:32
7
What is the material‑change doctrine and how does it affect the appealability of class‑certification orders?
1:40:32–1:57:23
8
What are the final positions of the counsel on certification, jurisdiction, and the relief sought?
1:57:23–2:15:19