Lackey v. Stinnie (23-621)

argument 23-621

Lackey v. Stinnie

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 17m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 1 month ago official recording ↗

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What is the legal definition of a “prevailing party” under Section 1988?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next in case twenty three six twenty one lackey versus Stinny. Ms. Mainley.

Sarah Mainley 0:06

Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The prevailing party is the party who wins the lawsuit, obtaining a final judgment in its favor, or, at least, a party who obtains a ruling that the defendant is liable on the merits of one or more claims, such as a summary judgment or a judgment as a matter of law. A preliminary injunction is neither a final judgment nor a determination that the defendant is liable on the merits for violating federal law. It is simply a threshold prediction of the likelihood of success, based on a truncated record and an initial, often hasty, assessment of the law that may well prove to be faulty as the case proceeds. It provides no enduring relief. By its nature, it is a temporary procedural order that dissolves upon final judgment.

Sarah Mainley 0:58

A preliminary injunction, therefore, does not make a plaintiff a prevailing party within the meaning of that legal term of art, and thus no statutory exception to the default American rule applies. Legal dictionaries at the time Congress enacted Section 1988 define prevailing party based on whether the party had successfully maintained its claim looking to the end of the Suit, not on its degree of success at earlier stages. This court's precedent similarly provides that liability for fees and liability on the merits go hand in hand. The court should therefore adopt a bright line rule serving the critical interest in ready administrability. That a preliminary injunction does not make a plaintiff the prevailing party.

Sarah Mainley 1:48

I look forward to this court's questions.

Clarence Thomas 1:52

Uh you Can a uh consent decree or default judgment uh Uh uh. support a uh prevailing uh party.

Sarah Mainley 2:02

Yes, I think so, Justice Thomas. Under this court's precedent, the court held in mayor that a consent decree qualifies. And it's suggested in Kurt Sang that a default judgment would also qualify. And and a default judgment and a consent decree are similar in that they're both situations where the court has not ruled on the merits, but because the defendant has waived or forfeited It a challenge to the merits, the court nonetheless enters a final judgment in the plaintiff's favor.

Clarence Thomas 2:34

But I thought your argument hinged on uh a court uh ruling in favor of uh on the merits uh in favor of the prevailing party.

Sarah Mainley 2:44

For an interlocutory ruling that's correct, Justice Thomas, but it's either an interlocutory ruling or a favorable final judgment. If a a party has a favorable final judgment, it has won the lawsuit and thus it falls within the definition of a prevailing party for that reason.

John G. Roberts 3:07

What do you do with the formulation of the by your friend, which is the question is whether they got uh as much relief as they needed. I wonder why that doesn't fit uh under the prevailing party language. In other words, I don't know what that would be like a They're they want to do a parade tomorrow, they get a preliminary injunction, the parade goes forward, and they haven't gotten a final judgment, but they don't need a final judgment.

Sarah Mainley 3:33

A couple of responses to that, Mr. Chief Justice. First, it's not sufficient for an interlocutory order because there's been no determination that the defendant has violated federal law or that the plaintiff's claim is actually succeeds on the merits. And second, at least certainly in a situation such as this one, the plaintiffs got what they wanted, but ultimately They got what they wanted because the Virginia legislature repealed the statute. So they didn't ultimately get the relief that they wanted from the court. Well but

Elena Kagan 4:07

they did. They got interim relief. They had their licenses restored. And they had it restored without paying a fee. And they drove around despite the existence of the statute for I think sixteen or eighteen months, whatever it was. So it was it it was final. It was never reversed, dissolved or otherwise undone by a final decision. Which is all that Seoul said. And we d have never required a final judgment in at least two cases, Hanoran and Texas State teachers.