Lange v. California (20-18)
argument 20-18Lange v. California
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 52m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the central Fourth Amendment question about hot pursuit and misdemeanor arrests?
We will hear argument this morning in Case 2018, Lang v. California. Mr. Fisher.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, there is no basis in precedent or history for the categorical pursuit rule applied below. Police officers may not enter a person's home without the approval of a magistrate unless the emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant. So the key question here is whether probable cause to believe a person has committed a misdemeanor and retreated automatically gives rise to an exigency requiring immediate action. For two reasons, the answer is no. First, the governmental interest in investigating minor offenses is not always, or even usually, strong enough to support home entries unsanctioned by judicial officers. As Justice Jackson noted over a half century ago, and Judge Sutton stressed more recently, such invasions can be wholly out of proportion with minor, nonviolent offenses, not to mention mere infractions, which are also swept up in the court-appointed amicus's rule.
Second, as the numerous cases in the brief demonstrate, there are many non-threatening reasons why people sometimes step inside or continue into their garages when pursued by officers. Teenagers are sometimes frightened or confused and wish their parents to be present for any questioning. Women driving alone are sometimes afraid to stop on dark roads and occasionally are not even sure those following them are police officers. And residents of certain communities often wish to avoid having others see them interacting with the police, particularly when they're likely to be asked to identify perpetrators of other, more serious offenses. None of this is to say that a person who retreats into his or her dwelling is, as Amicus puts it, home free.
A warrantless entry is still allowed when a concrete emergency exists, and even when there isn't any emergency, the police still have many options, including simply knocking on the door. But if a homeowner in this situation insists, it is not too much to ask for officers to procure a warrant before breaching the Fourth Amendment's most sacrosanct space. I'm happy to take questions.
Mr. Fisher, you just said that the police could just go ahead and knock on the door. I would expect that would be a terribly dangerous situation. The one thing you know is that the person inside is trying to get away from you, and if you go right up to the door and knock, there's no reason you shouldn't be concerned that he might swing the door open and have a gun. And the alternative you suggest about, well, just, you know, you can go get a warrant, but... You know, it's easier to get a warrant now than it was maybe 20 years ago, but you still don't have any idea how long that's going to take. And during that time, you know, the person in the house can also, you know, destroy evidence or, again, arm himself, call Confederates to come.
I think your options really put the police in a dangerous situation.
Mr. Chief Justice, let me first address knocking specifically and then the array of options. As to knocking specifically, I think it's important to bear in mind that the amicus here is asking for a categorical rule that sweeps up everything that is categorized as, quote, hot pursuit. And so, yes, that's going to involve some dangerous situations like you're imagining, and there may well be exigent circumstances there that allow dispensing with knocking. But The definition of hot pursuit the other side is propounding includes somebody simply stepping in off their front porch or driving into their garage, as in this case. So there are going to be many situations where somebody seems to be just simply seeking a moment of refuge or respite.
And I think in those situations, knocking may work. But if knocking doesn't work all the time, as the courts noted more recently, warrants can be available within five or ten minutes sometimes.
Well, sometimes, but, you know, even places that have a system set up like that, you know, your magistrates are on duty and you can call them, it's not always the case that you get through right away.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central Fourth Amendment question about hot pursuit and misdemeanor arrests?
0:00–14:12
2
How do the justices define “hot pursuit” and its required elements?
14:12–28:37
3
Why do some justices argue for a categorical rule versus a case‑by‑case analysis?
28:37–43:48
4
What historical common‑law precedents influence the hot‑pursuit doctrine?
43:48–59:44
5
How do the parties address the felony‑misdemeanor distinction in warrantless entries?
59:44–1:14:51
6
What practical concerns do law‑enforcement officials raise about obtaining warrants quickly?
1:14:51–1:27:45
7
How might a presumption or bright‑line rule affect police discretion and constitutional rights?
1:27:45–1:40:42
8
What conclusion do the Justices reach regarding the appropriate rule for hot pursuit?
1:40:42–1:52:22