Lawson v. FMR LLC (12-3)

argument 12-3

Lawson v. FMR LLC

Supreme Court of the United States 59 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the statutory purpose of § 1506 and how does it protect whistleblowers?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument. Uh next in case twelve three, Lawson and Zhang versus FMR L C. Mr. Snapper?

Unknown 0:08

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Section fifteen fourteen A is written in the classic language which Congress utilizes to regulate relationships between employees and their employers. Legislation regarding how an entity is to treat an employee is understood to refer to the entity's own employees. And that is particularly true here. where the phrase terms and conditions of employment is used in the statute. If section fifteen fourteen A forbade only contractors. to just retaliate against employees in the terms and conditions of their employment. I don't think there'd be any question. that the courts would understand it was referring to the contractors' own employees. The statute has the sam that language has the same meaning, even though it's combined in this instance with prohibitions against retaliation by other types of actors.

Unknown 0:59

The First Circuit's decision interpreting fifteen fourteen A to permit a contractor to retaliate against own employees is inconsistent with this general usage and it leads to four implausible consequences. First, it renders the statutory language regarding contractors virtually meaningless. Secondly, It renders that language with regard to contractors in the mutual fund industry literally meaningless. Third, it has the implausible consequence of permitting the very type of retaliation that we know Congress was concerned about retaliation by an accountant such as Arthur Anderson. And finally, it renders incoherent the provisions uh in fifteen fourteen A and the related remedial provision regarding Center.

Unknown 1:43

uh the burden of proof and an affirmative defense.

Samuel A. Alito 1:46

Is it your position that Uh employees of any officer, employee contractor, subcontractor or agent of a public company uh are covered.

Unknown 1:58

They're all covered. Uh I'm not uh uh it it's our position that employees of contractors and subcontractors are covered. All employees or would you limit it To the ones that had a hand in executing the contract. If I understand the question correctly, we we have not taken a position and the standard we advanced does not address the question of an of a and a personal employee of an employee, such as uh Ken Lace Butler. But that would raise distinct

Samuel A. Alito 2:27

issues. If it doesn't include that, then then how do you avoid that with your reading of the text?

Unknown 2:32

Your Honor, our view of this is that um The the meaning of the term employee depends on the context in which it's used and it ought to be assessed separately for each of the actors. So when it says um uh no uh publicly traded company may retaliate against an employee, it means an employee of the publicly traded company. But and and the same thing with contractor and subcontractor. But If we had a statute which by itself said no employee uh personal employ no employee of an officer shall do something. A no the n uh the normal reading of that would be to refer to uh an employee of the officer's company. Uh and we have statutes that impose uh personal liability on officials for things they are doing in their companies, and that's the way they read.

Unknown 3:21

So I it's already sort of peculiar. I mean I I'm really uh y I I don't see how you can piece it out like that that uh It includes employees of uh contractors, subcontractors, but not not of uh any officer. But let me ask you this, if it does include employees of of an officer uh i is it is it as much of a disaster as uh as your opponent suggests uh That is to say, would would a firing for something that had nothing to do with the securities laws uh be swept in? To Um the statute uh forbids retaliation for protected activity related either to the securities law or to certain criminal fraud provisions. And that's quite deliberate. The statute is the the Sarbans Oxley is not limited to corporate misdeeds and related things.

Unknown 4:19

Title VIII and Title IX also deal specific deal much more broadly with criminal fraud. Title IX uh increases the penalty for wire fraud and male fraud without regard to whether it has it was by a corporation or an individual.