LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (20-807)
argument 20-807LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 41m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What is the statutory definition of “use” for locomotives under the Safety Appliance Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case twenty eight zero seven. Ledore versus Union
Pacific Railroad Company. Mr. Frederick. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. In nineteen oh four, this court held in Johnson versus Southern Pacific that a motionless dining car was in use when a worker's hand was crushed while he was trying to couple the car with a locomotive. That case construed use under the Safety Appliance Act of eighteen ninety three. In nineteen eleven, Congress incorporated the exact same statutory language in the first version of what became the Locomotive Inspection Act. In Brady, this court held that a motionless car was still in use when an inspector was injured. In Lilly, this court held that a locomotive tender was in use under the Inspection Act when an employee slipped while servicing a tender that was stationary.
The slipping hazard there violated applicable regulations and this court upheld the workers' negligence per se claim. In this case, the Seventh Circuit disregarded those precedents and the statute's plain meaning of use. It held that the UP fifty six eighty three locomotive was not in use because it was stationary on a sidetrack and part of a train needing to be assembled before its use in interstate commerce. Under this court's precedence and the statute's plain meaning, a locomotive is in use when the carrier is employing it for the railroad's purposes. A brief stop in the middle of a journey to change crews and to power off the locomotive does not take the locomotive out of use. U P fifty six eighty three was still available as backup power.
To provide an electrical and hydraulic connection to the rest of the train. And to provide braking capability when the train resumed its journey. Because this case is in the heartland of a carrier's use of a locomotive, the court need not define the price contours of when a locomotive is not in use. Brady nonetheless suggests a workable standard. When the locomotive reaches a place dedicated to repair or the carrier withdraws the locomotive from service by making it inoperable. I welcome the Court's questions. If I could just start with the statutory language,
Council, um You use precedence under the Safety Appliance Act and the uh Locomotive Inspection Act. uh pretty much interchangeably. Um but I wonder if that's fair, uh because uh Yeah. The the sense of use of a locomotive uh strikes me as different than the sense of use of typical railroad cars. Um uh locomotives their primary purpose is to move and move things. Uh rail cars, you know, not not the same way. So um I wonder if it's fair to just use those precedents interchangeably.
I think it is fair and there are a number of reasons why, Mr. Chief Justice. Let me just start with a statute. The Safety Appliance Act defines rail vehicles to include locomotives. So locomotives are encompassed within the protections provided by the Safety Appliance Act. Second, when Congress enacted the Locomotive Inspection Act, it adopted the very same words and using the impairi material canon The court ordinarily would construe the same words to have the same meaning, particularly when they cover the same subject, which is rail safety for the protection of workers. Doctrinally, the court has used that principle and the uh application of use in multiple cases. I can point you to URI to Lilly, to Tipton, where the Court has said that the precedents in the SAA context apply equally to the LIA context.
But you
can readily think of situations where the point of course of my Uh I appreciate your answer, but the point of the question is that in in the LIA you're dealing particularly with locomotives and Um You know, it it seems uh suppose I have a car in the driveway, uh I wouldn't say the car is being used just because it's sitting there and I might want to use it later. Its primary purpose is to move some people around and uh uh not sit waiting even if waiting ready to be used later on.
Well, Your Honor, of course, that hypothetical doesn't describe our case because our case involved a locomotive connected to other train cars.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the statutory definition of “use” for locomotives under the Safety Appliance Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act?
0:00–14:00
2
How do the Supreme Court’s prior cases (Johnson, Brady, Lilly, etc.) shape the interpretation of “use” in this case?
14:00–28:36
3
Why does the Seventh Circuit’s narrow reading of “use” conflict with the Court’s precedent?
28:36–42:07
4
When is a stationary locomotive considered “in use” for safety‑regulation purposes?
42:07–55:23
5
What factors determine when a locomotive is withdrawn from active service (storage, repair, de‑fueling, battery removal)?
55:23–1:07:39
6
How does the “safe harbor” provision in the Safety Appliance Act affect the analysis of locomotive movements for repair?
1:07:39–1:19:10
7
What are the arguments about applying the same “use” definition to both locomotives and rail cars?
1:19:10–1:33:03
8
What is the Court’s proposed test for deciding whether a locomotive is “in use” and how does it impact worker safety liability?
1:33:03–1:41:03