Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania (19-431)
argument 19-431Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 39m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 8 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania case about and why is it before the Supreme Court?
We will hear argument first this morning in case number 19-431, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania and the Consolidated Case. General Francisco.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. In 2011, the government required employers to provide insurance coverage for all FDA-approved contraception, including many religious employers who objected to the coverage, sparking years of litigation. In 2017, in the best traditions of this country's commitment to religious liberty, the government sought to resolve the issue by promulgating new rules exempting those employers who objected to the mandate. Those exemptions are lawful for two reasons. First, they're authorized by Section 13A4 of the ACA, which requires employers to provide the types of coverage that the Health Resources and Services Administration provides for and supports. So it authorizes the agencies to require most employers to provide contraceptive coverage while exempting the small number of employers who have sincere conscientious objections.
But it doesn't create an all or nothing choice, require coverage for everyone or no one. Otherwise, the longstanding church exemption, the effective exemption for self-insured church plans, and indeed respondent's understanding of the accommodation itself would also violate the statute since the employer's group health plans don't provide the mandated coverage. Second, RFRA at the very least authorizes the religious exemption. It prohibits the government from imposing a substantial burden on religious belief subject to a discretionary exception. It may substantially burden religious belief if it can satisfy strict scrutiny, but RFRA doesn't require the government to do that. Otherwise, the government would have to divine the stingiest accommodations that a court would uphold, virtually guaranteeing a loss in every case.
Neither RFRA nor the ACA requires that result. I'd like to begin with the Section 13 issue, which requires employers to provide whatever coverage HRSA provides for and supports.
General, before you get to that, I'd like to ask you a question on your RFRA point. I wonder why it doesn't sweep too broadly. It is designed to address the concerns about self-certification and what the Little Sisters call the hijacking of their plan. But the RFRA exemption reaches far beyond that. In other words, not everybody who seeks the protection from coverage has those same objections. So I wonder if Your reliance on RFRA is too broad.
I don't think so, Your Honor, for a couple of different reasons. First, RFRA itself and its operative language prohibits the government from imposing a substantial burden subject to a single exception. And when you look at that exception, what it says is that the government may impose that burden if it thinks it can satisfy strict scrutiny. So once there's a substantial burden, the government has the flexibility to lift it in different ways, including through a traditional exemption. Otherwise, this court's decision in Zubik doesn't make a whole lot of sense. because there the court ordered the government to consider further modifying the accommodation, even assuming the accommodation fully satisfied RFRA.
That doesn't make sense if RFRA prohibits anything that it doesn't affirmatively require. But secondly, even if...
Thank you, counsel. Justice Thomas?
Justice Thomas? Well, we'll come back to Justice Thomas. Justice Ginsburg.
The glaring feature of what the government has done in expanding this exemption is to toss to the winds entirely Congress's instruction that women need and shall have seamless no-cost comprehensive coverage. Seamless, no-cost comprehensive coverage. This leaves the women to hunt for other government programs that might cover them. And for those who are not covered by Medicaid or one of the other government programs, they can get contraceptive coverage only from paying out of their own pocket, which is exactly what Congress didn't want to happen. And in this area of religious freedom, the major trend has not to give everything to one side and nothing to the other side.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania case about and why is it before the Supreme Court?
0:00–14:06
2
How does Section 13A4 of the ACA give the government authority to require contraceptive coverage and create exemptions?
14:06–28:49
3
Why do the parties argue that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) supports the religious exemptions?
28:49–41:45
4
What is the “accommodation” for religious employers and how does it differ from the new exemptions?
41:45–55:49
5
How do the states claim standing and why are nationwide injunctions contested in this litigation?
55:49–1:07:26
6
What procedural issues under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are raised about the interim final rules?
1:07:26–1:17:40
7
How might the government’s moral exemption for contraception be evaluated under the arbitrary‑and‑capricious test?
1:17:40–1:28:32
8
What are the parties’ final arguments about agency authority, cost‑neutral coverage, and the balance of interests?
1:28:32–1:39:18