Lockhart v. United States (14-8358)

argument 14-8358

Lockhart v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States 55 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central statutory issue in Lockhart v. United States?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 14-8358, Lockhart v. United States. Mr. Zass?

John J. Zazinski 0:12

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, this case concerns the 10-year mandatory minimum prison sentence that Section 2252B2 sometimes requires federal judges to impose. The statutory language in dispute reserves this severe punishment for a defendant with a prior State conviction for an offense relating to any kind of sexual abuse involving a minor or ward. Because Petitioner's prior offense did not involve a minor or ward, the statute's mandatory minimum penalty does not apply to him.

Unknown 0:50

JUSTICE GINSBERG. Suppose the conviction had been under Federal law, the conviction for sexual abuse of an adult. And we have the same question. Does the mandatory minimum apply? I take it if it had been under federal law, then the mandatory minimum would apply.

John J. Zazinski 1:10

That's correct. If the conviction had been under Chapter 109A of Title 18, which covers sexual abuse offenses, then it would trigger the mandatory penalty. But Congress, in this statute, since the time it was first enacted in 1978 — has never sought to create symmetry or parity between the Federal predicates and the State predicates. This may be most clear now in Subsection 2252 , where you can see that a prior Federal conviction for sex trafficking of anyone, which is a violation of Section 1591, the corresponding State analog is textually limited to sex trafficking of children. So this decision to treat prior state and federal predicates differently is inescapable. And it's been true ever since the first statute.

John J. Zazinski 2:05

So from

Unknown 2:06

1970- I don't know why it isn't inescapable. It does seem to me that Congress, eight years later when it wrote the second statute, used the same style and that this very much favors the government. But then you say that that's inapplicable because?

John J. Zazinski 2:23

Because when this language was first added- First, it was added in 1994, the

Unknown 2:28

federal

John J. Zazinski 2:29

predicates. At that time, there were still no state law predicates at all. In 1996, when the language was first introduced, and it was then introduced in subsection B1, which applies to the distribution and receipt offenses, even then, the penalty for simple possession of child pornography was the only federal predicate. So someone in Mr. Lockhart's position at that time would not have faced the mandatory minimum penalty, even if people who committed the distribution offenses would, or even if he had a conviction for under Chapter 109A. And then in 1998, when this language in dispute was then added at the government's urging to subsection B2, even at that time, Congress clearly wasn't aiming for parity because then they added a new federal predicate, Chapter 117 offenses, which are violations of the Mann Act, transportation for illegal sexual activity.

John J. Zazinski 3:36

But at that time, it didn't add any state offense analog for that offense. This has continued up to the present day. So in 2003 — There were amendments to add the obscenity offenses, the federal obscenity offenses, in Chapter 71 to the list of federal predicates, but no corresponding state crime for obscenity offenses. How

Unknown 4:00

do you say it works now for the manufacturing — and distribution offenses. We have your position on the possession when you say there's a disparity between a Federal conviction and a State conviction. How about a conviction either for manufacturing or distribution?

John J. Zazinski 4:20

MR. Yes. So that offense is covered by the different provision of Section 2251E. That's the penalty provision for the much more serious crime. of actually using minors or children to produce this material. The language in 2251E, as amended in 2006, it does seem to track, to qualify the predicates to include state law abuse offenses that involve adults as well as children. But that's because there's an important textual difference between Section 2251E and the statute we're talking about. So if you go back to Section 2252B2, you'll see an important textual point here, which is the word or. This may be easier to follow if you actually look at the statute, if you don't have it open in the statutory appendix to the blue brief at page 10A.