Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez (18-8369)
argument 18-8369Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
4 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the central legal issue before the Supreme Court in Lomax v. Ortiz‑Marquez?
We'll hear argument this morning, Case 188369, Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez. Mr. Burgess.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, without prejudice dismissals for failure to state a claim are not strikes under Section 1915G for three reasons. First, the statute uses a familiar legal phrase with a well-established meaning in the context relevant here. When courts review judicial orders to determine their impact on a future action, Evaluating preclusion, for example, they conclusively presume that the phrase dismissed for failure to state a claim means dismissed with prejudice. In 1915G, Congress used the same phrase in the same basic context. There is every reason to think Congress expected courts to apply the phrase's settled meaning rather than to convert ordinary without prejudice dismissals into sanctions that restrict future suits.
Second, the structure of the PLRA further supports that interpretation. Read together, the three dismissal categories identified in 1915G target actions that are facially meritless or otherwise abusive. Without prejudice dismissals for failure to state a claim are different. They may be based on purely procedural defects such as the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. And it would be odd to impose a strike for such suits since Congress excluded from 1915G's reach other categories of dismissals that don't implicate the merits or otherwise suggest abuse such as dismissals based on sovereign immunity. Third and related, the other side's interpretation upsets the PLRA's balance by punishing prisoners for dismissals that by definition say nothing about the ultimate merits of their action.
This interpretation frustrates the Act's objective to filter out bad claims while still allowing for consideration of the good, since it restricts a prisoner's ability to bring a potentially legitimate claim even after the prisoner has cured a procedural defect. I'd like to start with the text of the statute. The other side's lead argument is that the term dismiss is sufficiently capacious to encompass both dismissals with prejudice or dismissals without prejudice as a dictionary matter. We don't disagree with that proposition, but we don't think that argument takes adequate account of the full statutory phrase at issue here and the context in which it is being used. You are assuming that The preclusion question and the IRP status go hand in hand, but it could well be that a dismissal without prejudice will not have preclusive effect, but at the same time, it could mean that you have to pay the filing fee.
You seem to be assuming that these two go hand in hand, but that's not necessarily so. I think it's true that they are analytically separable. You could imagine having a consequence in the latter circumstance even if there wouldn't be a preclusion consequence. But the point of our argument is that in the particular context where this phrase is being used in 1915G, where you are looking to the consequence a dismissal has on the ability to bring a future action, the phrase dismissed for failure to state a claim has an established meaning and courts would understand Congress to have meant to signal that the dismissal would be with prejudice, that that is all that's being covered. And we think if you look to the structure of the statute, that further supports that interpretation.
As I said at the opening, these dismissals that are being targeted, and the other side appears to agree in this briefing, are actions that are on their face meritless or otherwise abusive. When you're dealing with a dismissal without prejudice or failure to state a claim, it does not fit into that box because it can be for things that are purely procedural defects that suggests nothing about the merits of the action. And it's conspicuous that Congress excluded other types of dismissals from 1915G that share that feature. I mentioned sovereign immunity. The other side argues that, you know, well, even an action that is dismissed without prejudice could be considered meritless in the relevant sense because it is consuming the Court's resources and not getting relief.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central legal issue before the Supreme Court in Lomax v. Ortiz‑Marquez?
0:00–7:17
2
How do the parties interpret the phrase “dismissed for failure to state a claim” under §1915 G?
7:17–14:39
3
Why do the counsel argue that dismissals without prejudice should not count as a strike?
14:39–21:04
4
What role does the structure of the Prison Litigation Reform Act play in the parties’ arguments?
21:04–28:55
5
How do the justices address the impact of Rule 15 and amendment rights on strike calculations?
28:55–35:40
6
What are the circuit splits and precedents cited regarding “failure to state a claim” dismissals?
35:40–42:51
7
Why do the advocates claim that counting without‑prejudice dismissals as strikes would upset the PLRA’s balance?
42:51–50:35
8
What conclusion do the parties seek from the Court and how do they summarize their position?
50:35–58:06