Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo, Sec. of Comm. (22-451)

argument 22-451

Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo, Sec. of Comm.

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 16m 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 8 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central dispute over federal monitoring costs for commercial fishing vessels?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next in case 22451, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.

Neal K. Katyal 0:06

Mr. Clement. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, this case well illustrates the real-world cost of Chevron, which do not fall exclusively on the Chevrons of the world, but injure small businesses and individuals as well. Commercial fishing is hard. Space on board vessels is tight, and margins are tighter still. Therefore, for my clients, having to carry federal observers on board is a burden, but having to pay their salaries is a crippling blow. Congress recognized as much by strictly limiting the circumstances in which domestic fishing vessels could be saddled with monitoring costs and capping them at 2 to 3 percent of the value of the catch. But the agency here showed no such restraint, requiring monitoring on 50 percent of the trips at a cost of up to 20 percent of their annual returns.

Neal K. Katyal 0:59

Nonetheless, the court below deferred to the agency to because it viewed the statute as silent on the who pays question. There is no justification for giving the tie to the government or conjuring agency authority from silence. Both the APA and constitutional avoidance principles call for de novo review, asking only what's the best reading of the statute. Asking instead, is the statute ambiguous, is fundamentally misguided. The whole point of statutory construction is to bring clarity, not to identify ambiguity. The government defends this practice not as the best reading of the APA, but by invoking stare decisis. That is doubly problematic. First, at issue here is only Chevron's methodology, which is entitled to reduced stare decisis effect.

Neal K. Katyal 1:45

We have no beef with Chevron's Clean Air Act holding, and we could not take issue with its APA holding because it failed to mention that statute. But second, all the traditional stare decisis factors point in favor of overruling Chevron's methodology. The doctrine is unworkable as its critical threshold question of ambiguity is is hopelessly ambiguous. It is also a reliance-destroying doctrine because it facilitates agency flip-flopping. So the reality here is the Chevron two-step has to go and should be replaced with only one question. What is the best reading of the statute? I welcome the Court's questions.

Clarence Thomas 2:23

All

Neal K. Katyal 2:23

right.

Clarence Thomas 2:24

Mr. Clement, you heard the General's arguments with the use of mandamus as a basis for deference. Could you comment on that? Because my understanding of mandamus is that the duty has to be clear before it actually lies. But I'd like your comment on that.

Neal K. Katyal 2:49

Absolutely, Justice Thomas. So I think mandamus is a critical recognition of the fact that, of course, Congress can limit the remedies available in particular circumstances, and that's the right way to understand the mandamus standard. But that's quite different from telling the courts that they're to engage in statutory construction, as Congress clearly did in Section 706 of the APA, but then say there's a point at which you can't actually give us your best answer because you're deferring. And I think it's important from a separation of powers purpose to understand that it's not just remedies are different. There's an accountability difference. Because I suppose Congress tomorrow could decide that we're going to go back to a world where the only review of executive branch action is mandamus.

Neal K. Katyal 3:32

But then Congress would be fully responsible for that highly unpopular decision. So that's the difference, I think, the fundamental difference from a separation of powers standpoint between a limitation on remedies where Congress does it specifically and And essentially telling the courts in the APA specifically, you have the interpretive authority over statutes no less than constitutional issues, but then overlaying a doctrine that says what we're doing is interpretation. And that's the critical thing about the interchange between footnote 9 and footnote 11. Footnote 9 tells you as clearly as you can what you're doing in a Chevron case is statutory interpretation. But then in footnote 11, it says at a certain point,