Lora v. United States (22-49)
argument 22-49Lora v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 8 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Does subsection 924(j) incorporate subsection 924(c) and bar concurrent sentences?
Mr. Rosenberg. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, Subsection nine twenty four J does not include or incorporate a bar against concurrent sentences. The government admits that at common law and under sentencing law, the default was to allow judges' discretion to sentence concurrently or consecutively. The government also admits that standing alone, Subsection nine twenty four does not bar concurrent sentences. What the government says is that the bar of subsection 924 C1 D2 applies, but that bar specifically applies only to sentences, quote, imposed under this subsection. That is subsection C, not another subsection such as subsection J. And that distinction is compelled by this court's precedent in Kuhn's Buick.
Moreover, there is nothing in the penalty provision of subsection J that refers to subsection C. Indeed, Congress enacted subsection J as a new subsection, not as a part of Subsection C. And it makes sense that there is discretion under Subsection J. J one primarily was concerned with imposing the death penalty for a murder by the use of a firearm and doesn't implicate consecutive sentences. And J two has a wide variety of conduct from involuntary manslaughter to voluntary manslaughter. The government's answer to all of this is that somehow Subsection C Is wholly incorporated into subsection J by implication. But that can't be right. Nothing in the text supports that, and it creates impossibilities. For example, voluntary manslaughter with a machine gun has a mandatory minimum penalty under subsection C of 30 years, but a maximum penalty of 15 years under subsection J.
They can't coexist. Yeah. This Court should hold that subsection J means what it says and reverse the court below. I welcome the Court's questions.
Uh what do you do with the government's argument that seems to suggest that it's simply an accumulation of the penalties, uh an aggregation or increase of the penalties under sea?
It's not just that. And the reason is it defines a separate crime, right? So there are additional elements, the element of a death in subsection J. It's not just an enhanced penalty provision. It actually creates a new crime. And if it didn't do that, you would run into the constitutional problems we discuss in our brief, because you have to have the additional element of a death proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury.
How could this have been written uh to come out uh in the government's favor uh from your perspective?
It could have been written a lot of ways. So number one is Congress could have said Section C when in C one D two. They could have said that the bar applies to this section, not subsection. Subsection J could have referred back to subsection C or C one D two in the penalty provision, which it didn't do. I suppose there are other ways that Congress could have written it as well. I mean Congress could have included subsection J in subsection C. At the outset, and it didn't do that. And it was very important, I think, if you look at the history, that Congress really wanted to make a special emphasis in J that it was doing something new, right? It was adding the death penalty for the use of a firearm, it was adding this really pretty broad variety of conduct in J 2 for manslaughter, and it purposefully did not include it in subsector.
Section C. Um and so the only, I think, natural conclusion that we can draw is that Congress did have a reason for doing it separately, and and we believe that the text of that of that subsection really controls here.
It's right though, isn't it, that a conviction under subsection nine hundred twenty four J you can't get one unless you prove beyond a reasonable doubt a violation of subsection C.
That is true. The underlying factual elements of having a drug trafficking crime or a crime of violence do have to be proven. I would just add, though, that it's not the same thing as actually charging somebody under subsection C, right? And so the government, in the ordinary course, does not charge under both subsections. It hypothetically could, but it usually doesn't.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
Does subsection 924(j) incorporate subsection 924(c) and bar concurrent sentences?
0:05–7:11
2
How does the government argue that subsection 924(j) implicitly includes subsection 924(c)’s penalties?
7:11–15:18
3
What textual and historical evidence suggests Congress intended subsection 924(j) to be separate from 924(c)?
15:18–22:51
4
How do mandatory minimums and the death‑penalty provision affect the interpretation of subsection 924(j)?
22:51–30:42
5
What is the role of the Blockburger test in determining whether 924(j) and 924(c) are separate offenses?
30:42–38:29
6
How might the statute‑of‑limitations differences between 924(j) and 924(c) influence charging decisions?
38:29–46:13
7
What are the practical consequences for sentencing if the Court treats 924(j) and 924(c) as one offense versus two?
46:13–53:15
8
What final position does the petitioner take and what relief is sought from the Supreme Court?
53:15–1:01:27