Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Resources Council, Inc. (11-460)
argument 11-460Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Resources Council, Inc.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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What is the central legal question about point‑source discharge in the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers?
We'll hear argument next in case eleven four sixty, Los Angeles Flood Control District, Virch versus the National Resources Defense Council.
Mr.
Coates.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that a discharge from a point source under the Clean Water Act occurred. in the Los Angeles and San Gabriel rivers. Based upon the fact that water moved from channelised portions of the Los Angeles and Sangaba rivers into what it termed, quote, naturally occurring. portions of those rivers. The court emphasized, in fact, That the discharge occurred because it moved through the concrete portions and in the words of the court itself, found at the Cert Appendix at forty four. It was quote again discharged to the rivers and the again meaning that it was prior uh prior time it was in the rivers. This is completely contrary to the court's decision.
In Mikasuki tribe, where the court held that there cannot be a discharge. for purposes of the NPDS permit programme and the Clean Water Act based upon the mere transfer of water within a single body of water. All the parties to this case agree that is the correct rule. Virtually all the Yamiki agree that is the correct rule. It's our view that that is dispositive of this case. is the only live issue before this court from the ninth circuit.
So why don't we just remand and let it sorted out under the right understanding of a legal rule. Which is basically what the government is saying with with an added twist 'cause it thinks there's another legal question. Ninth Circuit has answered, but we could go back and forth on that.
Correct. At minimum a a reversal is is warranted, with without a doubt. But I think given the record in this case is abundantly clear about what the claims were before the Ninth Circuit and what's going on with these monitoring stations. I mean These monitoring stations are clearly within the rivers themselves. There's just no dispute about that. Even the Ninth Circuit's opinion, like I said, the language of the opinion suggests that everybody agrees. Correct. And and the reason why I don't think there's an open remand is because there's nothing further in the record really to argue about. Um at minimum, of course, we would prefer a reversal And it would take an open remand. But I think given the record in this case, the only live train before the ninth circuit
Uh was this discharge theory when they found it in the middle of rivers and that being resolved against the respondents, there's no other live issue.
Well, it seems to me that they present a very direct syllogism. Um uh you have a permit that sets these monitoring stations where they are. The monitoring stations show exceedences. You have violated your permit. What what's wrong with that?
Well, because the nature of the monitoring here, for example, when you look at the permit in question, it doesn't say the monitoring of any permittee. If you look at the permit where it talks about the mass emissions monitoring stations, it talks about measuring discharges and compliance from the MS four, not any individual permittees M S four.
Right, but I understand the argument to be that that's the problem that your permit imposes on you. In other words, that uh This is where the monitoring station is supposed to be. What is it monitoring if not discharges from the MS four? But it's the For which you are responsible.
Your responsibility.
Well I think again you the the rules say that you look at the permits terms to interpret it. The Ninth Circuit did look at the permits terms. I mean it it dealt with this argument. And it noted that there are several factors in the permit that suggest that it did not relieve the response of the obligation of having to show an actual discharge of the
You don't question that there was an actual discharge.
Correct. But it's not a good thing. So there
are discharges, right?
But not discharges of pollutants and that's the same thing.
even below the ex the the permit level from your your uh Point sources.
Well, we don't know that.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central legal question about point‑source discharge in the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers?
0:01–7:10
2
How do the parties interpret the Clean Water Act and the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on the discharge theory?
7:10–15:07
3
Why is the location of the mass‑emission monitoring stations crucial to liability?
15:07–22:10
4
What arguments are made about each permittee’s responsibility for its own discharge?
22:10–30:36
5
How does the hypothetical concrete‑bank scenario illustrate the discharge issue?
30:36–38:56
6
What is the debate over cross‑petition requirements and the scope of the Supreme Court’s review?
38:56–46:37
7
What relief do the respondents seek—vacatur, remand, or reversal—and why?
46:37–54:35
8
How does the Court’s typical practice of vacating and remanding affect this case’s outcome?
54:35–1:01:26