Lynch v. Dimaya (15-1498)
argument 15-1498Lynch v. Dimaya
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the Court’s main argument about the vagueness of the crime‑of‑violence definition in § 16 B?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case fifteen fourteen ninety eight, Lynch versus Demon.
Mr Needler. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The Court of Appeals held that the definition of crime of violence in eighteen USC sixteen B is unconstitutionally vague on its face, relying on this Court's decision in Johnson holding the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act unconstitutionally vague. That was wrong for two reasons. First, the standard of vagueness applicable in an immigration proceeding is not the same as in a criminal uh proceeding, because the Constitution does not require prior notice that conduct will give rise to removal, and also because the immigration laws have long been administered by the executive and administrative proceedings uh because under broad delegations of authority.
because of the close relation of immigration to foreign relations and national security. Second, though, in any event, under the criminal vagueness standard applied in Johnson, sixteen B is not unconstitutional. As exemplified by this Court's unanimous decision in Laokow, in the more in the more than thirty years that sixteen B has been on the books, But Mr Nealer, didn't the government argue when when Johnson was before us that if the ACA residual clause was invalid, then sixteen B would be vulnerable because it was subject to the same central objection. Was not that the government's argument? Well the the the United States was responding to the argument that h that was made in Johnson, which was broader than the court's ultimate rationale.
Uh the uh to the extent substantial risk alone was thought to be a problem. Uh the court made clear in Johnson that cases involving references to substantial risk are not inherently problematic, and in fact, uh there are there are many such ones. The court focused its an analysis analysis uh on two different aspects, but they ha they have features that uh 16B does not have And make 16B very distinctive. And in fact, that's the reason why 16B has not given rise to the interpretive. uh confusion that finally led this Courton Johnson to hold
were the fact that we were asking courts to imagine what the ordinary crime was And there was no way to even think about what that was. your adversary points out with burglary. If the ordinary crime is during the day. there's one level of risk. If it's at night there's a different level of risk. the nature of the entry is um uh at question whether it's forcible or merely walking through an open door uninvited. Um It may be easier with burglary for lots of reasons, but there the level of what or what constitutes an ordinary crime was somewhat at the centre of Johnson. Why isn't it at the centre here?
Because I I I there are several very important distinctions between this case and Johnson with with respect to that. Uh the the ACA residual clause spoke in terms of a serious potential risk that serious injury uh to another person might uh might result. And as the court pointed out, that uh created uncertainty about things that could happen even after the offense was committed, um, and injury to to people uh bystanders or anyone else it could be. Section sixteen B is very different in that respect. It asks whether the offense by its nature Uh cr uh presents a substantial risk that physical force will be used against the person or property of another. And that's very different in several respects. It confines the analysis in both a temporal and functional sense to the elements of the offense.
You don't look at what conduct might might have happened afterward. It focuses narrowly on the elements of the offense because The the question is whether the use of physical force uh might be used in the course of committing that offense.
Mr. Needer, because this aspect of your brief was a a bit confusing to me, just because sometimes you are talking about temporal and sometimes you are talking about functional, and I want to know what you think the real limitation is. So take the example that you use, which is the possession of a shotgun example, right?
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Court’s main argument about the vagueness of the crime‑of‑violence definition in § 16 B?
0:00–7:24
2
How does the government distinguish the immigration vagueness standard from the criminal vagueness standard?
7:24–14:01
3
Why do the parties argue that burglary is a classic example of a § 16 B violent crime?
14:01–21:35
4
What role does the “in the course of committing the offense” language play in interpreting § 16 B?
21:35–28:49
5
How do the Justices use the shotgun‑possession example to test the scope of § 16 B?
28:49–36:56
6
Why is the moral‑turpitude statute relevant to the vagueness discussion in this case?
36:56–44:14
7
What are the implications of applying the criminal vagueness standard to immigration removal proceedings?
44:14–52:33
8
How might the Court’s decision affect future circuit splits on the categorical‑approach analysis?
52:33–59:35