Lynch v. Morales-Santana (15-1191)
argument 15-1191Lynch v. Morales-Santana
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What constitutional basis does the Court use to argue that citizenship is granted by Congress, not the Constitution?
We'll hear an argument this morning in Case 15-1191, Loretta Lynch, Attorney General v. Morelli-Santana. Mr. Needler.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the United States Constitution does not confer U.S. citizenship on anyone born outside the United States. Rather, pursuant to its plenary authority under Article I of the Constitution, it is for Congress to determine which categories of such persons should be granted U.S. citizenship by statute. In doing so, Congress has always required that the persons involved have a demonstrated and sufficient connection to the United States, either in themselves or through their parents, to warrant the conferral of citizenship because citizenship carries with it attendant duties and rights on the part of the individual and important duties of protection and obligation on the part of the United States government.
This case concerns the framework under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as originally enacted, for granting citizenship to persons outside the United States as of the date of their birth. Other provisions deal with the granting of citizenship later in life, those who are open to respondent or his father in this case, but were not taken advantage of. In particular, this case concerns the granting of citizenship to children born out of wedlock abroad, a situation in which this court's cases make clear that mothers and fathers are not typically similarly situated with respect to their legal status concerning the child at the moment of birth. The general rules for citizenship at birth are set out in 8 U.S.C.
1401, and I'm referring to the act as originally enacted. It was revised in 1986. If both parents were U.S. citizens, then a child born outside the United States would be a citizen of the United States as long as one of the parents had resided in the United States for any period of time. Congress deemed that to be a sufficient connection to the United States given that both parents were citizens. On the other hand, if one parent was a US citizen and one parent was an alien, Congress had a markedly different approach. The US citizen parent had to have resided in the United States for 10 years, five of which were after reaching the age of 14. Congress evidently determined that because such a child would have competing claims of allegiance, that a greater residency was required for the parent to establish the connection to the United States.
Is that an argument we heard
much about in the Flores VR case?
It was made at the oral argument in Flores v. R. But we think it's also evident from the face of the statute, as this Court said in the WEN, with respect to another argument that the Court addressed there, it's important for the Court itself to look at the structure, text, and operation of the statute to see what the purpose is.
I thought Flores v. R., the government's been... Most of us talk about the differential treatment primarily on the grounds of statelessness.
Right.
And here the thrust of your argument is somewhat a different need to ensure sufficient ties.
We're making both arguments, and we did argue in Flores VR that there should be a connection to the United States and that the statutory framework is set up that way. It's true that our emphasis was on statelessness, but we are now arguing, and again, we think it's entirely evident from the face of the statute that what these provisions are after is a connection to the United States.
Why aren't men and women who are parents... similarly situated with respect to their affiliation, their attachment to U.S. values. I mean, there's no reason to think a man is less — has less of a sense of of U.S. belonging than a woman.
Right. And we're making no such argument. The point is that where you have, at the moment of birth, the mother, as this Court recognized in the Nguyen case and is recognized in cases like Laird v. Robertson in the domestic context, the mother is the only legally recognized parent.
There are many cases, especially in generations back when this
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What constitutional basis does the Court use to argue that citizenship is granted by Congress, not the Constitution?
0:00–8:56
2
How does the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 differentiate residency requirements for children of married versus unwed U.S. citizen parents?
8:56–15:31
3
Why do the justices focus on the moment of birth rather than the moment citizenship is sought in the statute?
15:31–22:03
4
What is the equal‑protection argument regarding gender discrimination in citizenship transmission to children born abroad?
22:03–28:44
5
How does the Court evaluate the “connection to the United States” requirement for unwed citizen fathers versus mothers?
28:44–36:00
6
What remedial options (level‑up, level‑down, prospective relief) are being debated to fix the statutory gender disparity?
36:00–44:26
7
How might Congress’s historical intent and subsequent amendments influence the Court’s remedy decision?
44:26–52:11
8
What practical impact would applying the one‑year continuous residence rule to fathers have on citizenship outcomes?
52:11–59:54