Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC (13-1019)
argument 13-1019Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What statutory requirement does Title VII impose on the EEOC before it can sue a private employer?
We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 13-1019, Muck Mining LLC v. the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Mr. Goldstein.
Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court. Title VII prohibits the EEOC from suing a private employer unless it first attempts to resolve the claim of discrimination through conciliation. We ask the Court to hold that a Court may conduct a modest inquiry into whether the EEOC violated that statute. If it did, then the remedy generally is to require conciliation, not to dismiss the suit with prejudice.
At first I thought this was an Overton Park case committed by law to agency discretion, but then I couldn't find many cases in the government's brief to support that, so they have a different theory, and that's more their problem than yours. On the other hand, it seems to me that Judge Hamilton in the Seventh Circuit said it's hard to imagine more discretionary language than Congress used here. Shall endeavor to eliminate the unemployment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. It seems to me that those are very difficult words for your position.
Sure. So let me, Mr. Justice Kennedy, divide that question into two parts. What's the analytical framework? Is it Overton Park? Is it an APA case? Is it an implied private right of action case, which is what Judge Hamilton thought? And then turn to the words of the statute and what it means if we were even to concede that these are kind of unusual words for a court to administer. So the first is the doctrinal question. The government agrees that Judge Hamilton got it wrong in putting the burden on us to prove that there was an implied private right of action in This is a precondition to suit under Title VII. Everyone agrees that there doesn't have to be a special statutory provision. We say that this is a case like St.
Cyr, that it's a case in which the government has to prove, because there is compelled agency action here, the conciliation by the EEOC, that there is clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to withdraw the ordinary presumption that there is judicial review. So then the government's view, just to put out the third doctrinal framework, the government says, look, we think this is kind of an ordinary statutory construction case, and you should see whether it is that the three provisions of the statute on which they're relying are more consistent or less consistent with judicial review. We think that this is clearly a case. We cite Bowen, for example, in our brief. We cite a series of cases about
Congress having to give very clear evidence of intent to pull the courts out of the job of reviewing the agency action. Now, to take your point that this, and Judge Hamilton's point, that is, this kind of language is both deferential in that it's informal, you just have to endeavor. And this is arguably something that's a little bit unusual for courts to undertake. So first, doctrinally, the fact that Congress has given the courts an unusual job is not an excuse or a reason for the executive branch to tell you that you cannot do the job. That would turn Chevron on its head. Remember, the principle of Chevron
— Well, it's kind of an odd conciliation, isn't it? This is — EEOC is supposed to try to settle the matter. But there is no mutual obligation on the other side. There's no obligation at all on the part of the employer to cooperate to do anything.
Yes, Justice Ginsburg, and I think this has to be a point in our favor, the fact that it is unusual. Let me tell you how unusual it is, and that is the EEOC is required to do this with respect to four different statutes. The Housing and Urban Development Department has to do it, and the Federal Election Commission has to do it. So Congress has laid this out in a series of statutes where it wanted to impose on the agency this special obligation. Even with respect to Title VII, the private employee doesn't have to conciliate. The Attorney General doesn't have to conciliate. The EEOC doesn't have to conciliate if it's an urgent problem under the statute.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What statutory requirement does Title VII impose on the EEOC before it can sue a private employer?
0:01–9:32
2
How does the confidentiality provision affect the EEOC’s ability to disclose conciliation efforts?
9:32–17:55
3
What is the Court’s view on whether the EEOC must act in good‑faith during conciliation?
17:55–24:02
4
How does the 30‑day filing deadline shape the EEOC’s conciliation strategy?
24:02–31:48
5
Why does the government argue that Chevron deference applies to the EEOC’s discretionary duties?
31:48–39:02
6
What standards have the circuits adopted for reviewing the EEOC’s conciliation process?
39:02–46:31
7
Can an employer’s claim that it never received a conciliation letter be reviewed by the Court?
46:31–54:17
8
What would be the impact of the Supreme Court setting specific “rudiments” for EEOC conciliation?
54:17–1:00:38