Madigan v. Levin (12-872)

argument 12-872

Madigan v. Levin

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 0m 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal question about qualified immunity in Madigan v. Levin?

John G. Roberts 0:02

Our first case this term is Case 12-872, Madigan v. Levin. Mr. Scudro?

Unknown 0:14

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, Congress has crafted a comprehensive body of administrative and judicial procedures and remedies that are tailored specifically to combating discrimination against older workers. In extending these procedures and remedies to government employees, Congress did not intend to permit State and municipal workers alone to frustrate this regime or bypass it entirely using the more general remedies of Section 1983. This is a preliminary question before we get to the question you presented, and that is what authority did the Seventh Circuit have to deal with under the AIDS Discrimination Act. I mean, it went to the Seventh Circuit on interlocutory review of qualified immunity question.

Unknown 1:09

Everybody agrees that there is no qualified immunity, that there is indeed a claim that the Equal Protection Clause includes age. So Seventh Circuit had no authority to deal with any question other than that, did it? It did, Your Honor. The Seventh Circuit properly followed this Court's holding in Wilkie. In footnote 4 of that opinion, the Court concluded correctly that whether or not there was a Bivens action for a recognized, in that case, due process violation, was itself part and parcel of the first prong of the Qualified Immunity Inquiry and therefore properly considered But in Wilkie, the whole case was dismissed by the district court, wasn't it? So whatever was said in that footnote was dicta.

Unknown 2:02

Your Honor, there's an argument in one of the amicus briefs that there was an alternative route under 1254 in Wilkie, and therefore the argument is raised that it was dicta. But it wasn't dicta in context, Your Honor. The Court didn't consider that alternative route. The Court squarely held. that it had jurisdiction and that the — and it goes on to say in the footnote that the appellate court properly exercised jurisdiction because the question of whether there is or is not a Bivens action for this constitutional right is properly considered part of the QIA. MR.

Samuel A. Alito 2:35

Now, we have an amicus brief from law professors who argue that the Seventh Circuit should not have considered the question of whether there was a cause of action under Section 1983. But they also go on to argue that we nevertheless have jurisdiction to consider that question and that it is a a matter of discretion for us to decide whether to do that. Is that — do you agree with that position?

Unknown 3:01

MR. We do agree with that position. They cite Clinton v. Jones and they cite the Fitzgerald decision for that position, Your Honor. And we would agree that while those may be modest extensions of the holdings in those cases, we would agree that this Court can exercise 2254 jurisdiction over the — JUSTICE BREYER. If we adopt that formulation and that solution, is it as if we are granting certiorari before judgment on an issue in our own discretion? Is that the way it works? I think that — no, I think the Court would still fairly consider the Seventh Circuit's judgment on the issue, Your Honor. And again, I would return to — What's the mechanism for us — what's the rationale that we can exercise jurisdiction where a Court of Appeals could not?

Unknown 3:45

Because we have authority to — Grant social right before judgment or for some other reason? The theory advanced in the amicus brief with which we confer is that 1254 grants the court jurisdiction over the case, and that would include issues like this that were part and parcel of the case before the appellate court. Now, I should note that that amicus brief begins with the false premise that there was an exercise of pendant appellate jurisdiction in this case, and as we explained briefly in our reply brief, The one reference, the sole reference, dependent appellate jurisdiction on page 7A of the petitioner's appendix is merely a reference or a brief description of the failed argument advanced by the respondent that pendant jurisdiction would not be a proper argument.

Unknown 4:32

And the Court did not advance.