Manuel Ayestas v. Davis (16-6795)
argument 16-6795Manuel Ayestas v. Davis
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What is the legal basis of 18 U.S.C. § 3599 and how does it apply to indigent death‑penalty inmates?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case sixteen six seven seven seven seven seven nine five, Iestus versus Davis. Mr. Kowarski?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. 18 USC Section thirty-five ninety nine entitles indigent inmates facing the death penalty to reasonably necessary services, and services are reasonably necessary when they would be used to identify or develop possible claims by a reasonable attorney representing a paying client of ordinary means. But in the Fifth Circuit, the standard is higher. Inmates must show necessity that is not just reasonable, but that is substantial as a result. Adult courts in the Fifth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit alone are permitted to probe deeply into the merits and procedural viability of as yet undeveloped claims that the requested services might support.
Why would a uh reasonable attorney with finite means to spend spend them uh uh on the research into the facts uh as as you propose when he won't be able to submit those facts to the court under twenty two hundred and two fifty four E two?
Uh uh Mr. Chief Justice, uh I I actually think that uh the inmate will be able to submit those facts under twenty two fifty-four E two. And I also think that there are reasons why a reasonable attorney might pursue uh evidence notwithstanding the inability to introduce that evidence uh at an E two hearing to prove the under underlying constitutional violation.
Well, i if he is ever able to submit under E two, it would be because it's a new rule of constitutional law. I'm just looking at the statute here. or a factual predic predicate that could not have been previously discovered. And if it could not have been previously discovered It seems to me you won't be able to make a case of ineffective assistance of counsel. It's not ineffective if he couldn't have discovered it.
Mr. Chief Justice, you're uh looking at the two subsections under E two. Uh we actually drop out of the E two analysis because uh the inmate didn't quote unquote fail to develop the claim within the opening clause. So you uh the court would never even reach the analysis in the two subsections that you're uh
Well I would have thought he did fail to develop it. You just have An excuse, I guess, a reason why he shouldn't be faulted in your view, and that's because of the ineffective assistance of counsel. And you plan to make that case by submitting the new evidence that you want the funds to un uncover. And this says that you can't do that.
Uh I I we uh he did not f fail to develop the uh evidence in State Court and Williams B. Taylor of the court says that's not a no fault uh phrasing that failed to this issue was not aired at all below, was it?
No.
Uh so
you think it will be available on remand?
Uh the issue should be available to the Fifth Circuit on remand, although the Fifth Circuit has encountered this on a number of occasions and has refused to adopt the Director's interpretation. In fact, a number of states have pressed the Director's interpretation in a number of different courts of appeals, and not a single jurisdiction anywhere adopts it. So the idea uh pressing is Is
there a Fifth Circuit decision? You say you have encountered this in the Fifth Circuit. Is there a Fifth Circuit decision that rules on this?
Uh the Fifth Circuit decision that's most on point is Canalis uh v. Quarterman, uh or Canalis v. Failor. Canalis is the first name of the case. Uh and uh in that case it says in a footnote the director access uh asks us to take this step and we're not gonna do that.
But it sounds to me like that is we're not as as you suggest we should do here is you are not going to reach it and make a ruling on it.
Yes, exactly. I don't mean to suggest they've heard the issue and decided that it's non meritorious. It is just that the directors made that case to the Fifth Circuit and that is not the law on the Fifth Circuit. It is not the basis of a judgment below. It is not a bar that we will encounter unless the Fifth Circuit decides to make new law.
Could I ask you a a question about the jurisdictional issue that uh
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the legal basis of 18 U.S.C. § 3599 and how does it apply to indigent death‑penalty inmates?
0:00–7:43
2
How does the Fifth Circuit’s “substantial‑need” standard differ from the statutory “reasonably necessary” test?
7:43–15:12
3
When can appellate courts review disputes over the amount of funding granted under § 3599?
15:12–23:33
4
What does the word “May” in the statute signify and how does it affect a court’s discretion to deny services?
23:33–30:17
5
Can a district court conduct a preliminary merits analysis when deciding on a § 3599 funding request?
30:17–36:39
6
Is a denial of funding under § 3599 considered a collateral order requiring a Certificate of Appealability?
36:39–44:32
7
How do the limits of federal habeas review (E‑2, EDPA, Martinez) impact the reasonableness of funding decisions?
44:32–51:27
8
What is the Court’s ultimate conclusion on the proper standard and discretion for § 3599 funding?
51:27–59:03