Maracich v. Spears (12-25)
argument 12-25Maracich v. Spears
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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What is the DPPA’s express‑consent requirement and why does it matter?
We'll hear argument next in Case 1225, Maracic v. Spears. Mr. Guerra?
MR. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the DPPA requires express consent when personal information in DMV databases is used for bulk solicitation. The express consent requirement is Congress's considered response to one of the core problems that the DPPA targets, and the litigation exception creates no exception for lawyers. In fact, when Congress intended to create an explicit
exception — Does it create an exception for research? Let's assume that a university wanted to do a research project and it needs subjects. I get solicited for it all the time. Does this exception apply to them, too?
Our view, Your Honor, as we indicated in our reply brief, is it would not because we believe B-12's consent requirement governs commercial bulk use of DMV information, which is clear from the fact that it's focusing on marketing and solicitation, and also from the history behind the statute, which is very much aimed at use of DMV
information. But it says surveys, not just marketing or solicitations.
Yes, it does,
Justice Sotomayor. I mean, there is a commercial component, but there appears to be a non-commercial component as well.
We think, Justice Sotomayor, that the statute is sensibly construed to — under the nosider-associates principle that we're relying on elsewhere in our argument with respect to before, that that same principle applies to the three things that the bulk solicitation — the bulk use provision governs, and particularly when you look at the history underlying the statute, which was very much aimed at use of the information for direct marketing. And so — And as I was saying, Congress made clear
— That applied to the states, too, when they want to market against drunk driving. They want to market against — for their health insurance processes versus private processes for state drug-provided —
Justice Sotomayor, I believe what your first question sounded — your first example sounded like it was a noncommercial
—
use, I think that in the case where the State is acting as a commercial entity, the same rules we would apply with respect to lawyer solicitation would apply there. And the reason I say that and the reason I think it's so clear that Congress intended that really lies in the language of subsection B2, because there Congress made clear that it understood that these provisions are not wholly independent permissions and, in fact, that the consent requirement governs all commercial bulk use absent an explicit exception. And if you take a look, it's in the second page of the addendum to our opening brief. And it says that personal information may be used in connection with matters of motor vehicle market research activity, including survey research.
Congress included the survey research clause because a commercial bulk survey using personal information would otherwise be governed by B-12's consent requirement, and so Congress had to make clear that it was creating an exception for one industry to engage in this one particular type of bulk use. And the reason we know that the survey research clause means that is because under respondents' interpretation, it has no effect whatsoever. If, as they say, each of these clauses is wholly independent and sufficient to authorize whatever it covers, a phrase covering in connection with matters of motor vehicle market research activities is would in and of itself cover the subset of motor vehicle market research survey research.
How does the statute’s survey‑research exception affect lawyers’ use of DMV data?
So to give that clause any effect, you must understand that it's overriding the express consent requirement of B-12 such that you now have to, when you look at the other provisions that might authorize bulk commercial use, find a comparably explicit authorization, and you can't find that in B-4. B-4 says nothing about solicitation in much less bulk solicitation.
JUSTICE GINSBURG It says anticipation of litigation in connection — MR. Yes, Justice — JUSTICE GINSBURG Not only ongoing litigation, but it can be used in connection with anticipation of litigation.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the DPPA’s express‑consent requirement and why does it matter?
0:01–3:38
2
How does the statute’s survey‑research exception affect lawyers’ use of DMV data?
3:38–13:32
3
Why do the parties argue that B‑12’s consent rule overrides B‑4’s bulk‑use permission?
13:32–25:43
4
What is the difference between “investigation in anticipation of litigation” and solicitation?
25:43–41:19
5
How do class‑action notices and plaintiff‑identification letters fit within the DPPA?
41:19–54:15
6
Where do the justices draw the line between permissible investigation and prohibited solicitation?
54:15–58:52
7
How does the Court interpret the “in connection with” language across the DPPA’s exemptions?
58:52–59:43
8
What are the final arguments and the likely outcome of Maracich v. Spears?
59:43–1:01:05