Markazi v. Peterson (14-770)
argument 14-770Markazi v. Peterson
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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What is the central issue of the Markazi v. Peterson case before the Supreme Court?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case fourteen seven seventy, Bank Markazi versus Peterson. Mr Lamkin.
Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. For nearly two hundred years, Congress never enacted a statute that purported to limit its effect to one and only one specified case pending before Article three courts, disclaiming any reach beyond that solitary monetary dispute.
One case, I mean this is a consolidation for purposes of reaching assets, but it's a consolidation of some nineteen cases?
No, Your Honor, it is not a consolidation of nineteen cases. It began when the Peterson plaintiffs filed a turnover action. Other parties were interpleted, other parties intervened, but it has been one case with one caption ruled upon by one judge with one decision.
Well suppose there were three unrelated cases. Pardon? Suppose there were three unrelated cases, but the statute was passed.
So if Congress had identified three unrelated cases and said that for these unrelated cases, we believe that the result would be the same, that Congress crosses the threshold from legislation to adjudication when it attempts to pass a law which has no effect and no existence apart from specified cases pending before the
I inadvertently interrupted Justice Ginsburg. But in the nineteen cases here, you don't define that principle?
No, Your Honor, there aren't nineteen cases here. There is one case here.
That's correct. There are 19 underlying judgments, but only one execution. Are there are there
any in this category that is uh cases litigated to judgment for terrorists' acts? That I'm not in this package of nineteen cases.
I don't know whether there are any others that where they were denied um intervention here. But the point I think the fundamental point is that no future case that's identically situated, no other case except this one case will be subject to this rule.
What if there were nineteen cases, Mr. Lampkin, and Congress specified them
all? Yeah, I think the answer would be the same would be the same. And that is that when Congress dictates the outcome from a limited category of cases with one liable party that's unwilling to make that perspective. I guess what I'm asking is
what that means, the limited category. Is the number irrelevant if Congress specifies them? I mean Congress could specify a hundred. Congress could specify it I think I think it would be a good thing.
When Congress is not willing to make the law applicable generally to categories of cases, but singles out particular pending cases to alter the course of proceedings.
I imagine that a uh A a creative drafter could draft a statute that makes no reference to a particular case or two particular cases, but could put uh so many limitations on the scope of the law that in fact it applies only to one case or to a small number of cases, exactly the ones that Congress wants to target. Congress does that, is it different?
Right. I think, Your Honor, if Congress so limits and so cabins it that in effect it has limited the law to one and one case only. It's inexplicable except as an effort to limit it to one case and one case only. That would fall within our rule as well. And the principle underlying that is that Congress enacts laws. It doesn't adjudicate specific cases.
uh which which in which our court had come to a surprise decision which shortened what everybody thought had been the statute of limitations. for certain securities actions. Congress passed a law trying to reverse our decision. Uh it it said anybody who had filed the security action Prior to the date of this decision uh would be allowed to refile and uh proceed to judgment. We went through a lot of trouble. to say that uh Congress can't do that because Із реверсинг в аукціоне. of a court judgment. It would have been so easy to decide that case by saying, My lord, it's it's just referring to particular cases.
Well, in fact, the statute at issue in Plout and the reversed Lamp was a generally applicable case to all pending cases. Its problem was it went too far and addressed cases which had gone final, and this court had held that its authority to adjudicate cases includes the power to conclusively decide them, and so it went too far.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central issue of the Markazi v. Peterson case before the Supreme Court?
0:00–7:41
2
How do the parties argue whether Congress can target a single pending case versus a class of cases?
7:41–14:47
3
What historical precedents (e.g., Schooner Peggy, Robertson) are cited to define the separation‑of‑powers limits?
14:47–23:14
4
Why is the distinction between amending substantive law and dictating a case outcome crucial?
23:14–31:14
5
How does foreign sovereign immunity factor into the Court’s analysis of the statute?
31:14–38:11
6
What constitutional concerns (Bill of Attainder, Equal Protection, Due Process) arise from a law aimed at one case?
38:11–45:29
7
How do the hypothetical scenarios (e.g., multiple cases, pre‑filed lawsuits) illustrate the limits of congressional power?
45:29–53:52
8
What conclusions do the Justices reach about the permissible scope of Congress’s action in this case?
53:52–1:01:25