Martin v. United States (24-362)
argument 24-362Martin v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
52 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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Transcript
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What is the statutory basis of the law‑enforcement proviso in the FTCA?
We will hear argument first this morning in case twenty four three
sixty two, Martin versus United States. Mr Giacomo? Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1974 to ensure a legal remedy for the intentional torts of Federal police. The text of the law enforcement proviso is phrased affirmatively as a freestanding rule. With regard to Axro missions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States government, the FTCA shall apply to any claim arising out of six intentional torts. The United States is therefore liable for these intentional torts when committed by FBI agents empowered by law to execute searches, seizures and arrests. Petitioners bring the claims Congress expressly permitted, but the Eleventh Circuit held that sovereign immunity bars them.
As a result, the Court asked the parties to address two questions. First, whether the supremacy clause bars FTCA claims. The answer is no, and the parties agree. As a federal statute, the FTCA is protected by federal supremacy, not restricted by it. Second, whether the discretionary function exception is categorically inapplicable to proviso claims. The answer is yes for two distinct reasons. Read in harmony, the provisions cover different categories. Once a plaintiff satisfies Section thirteen forty six B one by alleging the elements of an intentional tort, the discretionary function exception does not apply because intentional torts require unlawfulness. There's no such thing as a discretionary intentional tort.
Right in hostility, assuming interstatutory conflict, The text, informed by familiar canons of construction in this court's precedent, demonstrates that Congress gave the proviso's waiver of sovereign immunity the last word. The proviso is the clearest statement of liability in the entire FTCA. So the government's argument in this case and the eleventh circuits holding below invite a simple question. If even proviso claims Congress amended the statute to affirmatively guarantee are barred by sovereign immunity, What is left of the Federal Tort Claims Act? I welcome the court's questions.
Uh how broadly does the uh proviso uh extend?
Well if if this court reads the proviso in harmony with the discretionary function exception It doesn't expand any more broadly than it needs to to make sure that those two don't come into conflict. But if the court presumes that there is conflict, Your Honor, then it would extend uh supersede the other exceptions.
So in this case, how would it apply?
In this case it would apply because the court would simply say the discretionary function exception doesn't apply to this category of claims. The law enforcement proviso does, and that's the end of the analysis for the second question presented.
So how how do we know in statutory interpretation how far a proviso like this applies?
Well, Your Honor, there are a number of of statutory canons of construction, and I think the answer to this specific question here is we know that it extends beyond simply subsection H, because Congress stated it as an affirmative freestanding rule as opposed to uh somehow being parasitic to the language before it in subsection H.
Well wouldn't you expect it to be uh placed someplace other than uh in one subsection after a colon?
So I would say as a general rule, Your Honor, the answer would probably be yes. But the reason the answer is no here is because when Congress enacted the law enforcement proviso, it understood that the only barrier to liability for the United States was the intentional torts exception, meaning Congress's understanding of the discretionary function exception is the same as the one I'm articulating here today.
And you get that from what? The legislative history?
No, Your Honor, I we get it directly from the language of the law enforcement proviso, but the legislative history or at least the context in which this amendment was made make very clear that our interpretation is the correct one.
But I guess I don't understand
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the statutory basis of the law‑enforcement proviso in the FTCA?
0:00–7:07
2
How does the Court define the two questions it asked the parties to address?
7:07–13:29
3
Why does the petitioner argue that the discretionary‑function exception does not apply to intentional tort claims?
13:29–22:06
4
What statutory‑interpretation canons are used to determine the scope of the proviso?
22:06–28:17
5
How do the facts of the Collinsville raid illustrate the conflict between the proviso and the discretionary‑function exception?
28:17–33:58
6
What is the significance of the Supremacy‑Clause argument for the FTCA claims?
33:58–38:23
7
How might the Court’s ruling affect the balance between federal immunity and victims’ remedies?
38:23–45:29
8
What are the parties’ final requests and the Court’s next steps on remand?
45:29–52:22