Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States (12-1173)
argument 12-1173Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the petitioner’s opening argument in Marvin Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States?
We'll hear argument next in case twelve eleven seventy three, Marvin Brandt Revocable Trust versus United States. Mr. Lechner.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. If upheld, the decision below will upset a hundred years of property law. entitled to perhaps a million acres of land based upon an implied reversionary interest that the government recently created. I'd like to make three points. First, The decision below violates Leo Sheep, where this court rejected the government's attempt to create a property interest through implication And reaffirm that the government does not retain any interest not expressly reserved in the patent or the granting statute. Two. The decision below is contrary to both the government's argument and this court's ruling in Great Northern that eighteen seventy five Act rights away are easements and not fees.
And finally, the decision below is inconsistent with the Department of Interior's long standing interpretation that the eighteen seventy five Act granted only an easement. It is axiomatic that the highest evidence of title in this country is a patent from the government. When the government issues a patent, it divests itself of title, except for those interests expressly reserved. Here the patent did not reserve any interest in the eighteen seventy five Act of the F. So you're not reading this, are you?
Here the patent did not reserve any interest in the eighteen seventy five Act right away. Yet the government knew how to reserve interests. at that time because it reserved the interest for ditches and canal and reserved the right to two forest service road when it issued the patent. That some interests were reserved by the government in nineteen seventy six shows that other interests were not.
Well under section nineteen twelve the government could did reserve an interest uh for a public highway, is that correct?
No. No. Uh nineteen twelve section nineteen twelve has to be read in conjunction with this court's decision in Northern Pacific v. Townsend and Stringham. And in those decisions this court held that railroad rights away were limited fees with implied reversionary interest.
The the patent you talk about, I'm not recalling it exactly, it had some it it mentioned the railroad interest, right?
Yes. It mentioned it in the context of The branch title is subject to those rights for railroad purposes. As it has been granted to the railroad under the eighteen seventy five Act. So it
didn't characterize it as either an easement or uh a fee with an implied reverter.
That it was subject to those rights for railroad purposes as have been granted to the railroad Sounds like it was granted subject to a servitude. Rights for railroad purpose sounds like a servitude. And of course that's how the Department of Interior interpreted it at the time that these eighteen seventy five Act rights away were easements. following its longstanding interpretation, plus this court's ruling in Great Northern, that these were easements. And at the time that regulation was the law of the land. that controlled the the title that the brand got at the time. What
they're saying, I think the government's point is the other side is is saying and I don't remember the term from my property law. It was uh what's the right term? Is you you you grant the A black acre to A and his heirs. It is a fee simple, but it's subject to a shifting it it is subject to divestiture, subject to a a condition subsequent. What's the right term? Well,
I mean Where it
shifts the it shifts it back. A
defeasible fee or it could be. There was a technical term we
used to have. But anyway, that is what they are saying. And they're saying that that is for for purposes of who owns the land The mineral rights. It's treated as an easement. But for purposes of deciding who it reverts to it's treated as a d uh a fee subject to uh a shifting use or whatever you called it. Subject to what did you say is a Subject to rule. Yeah.
Yes. But that's similar to the argument that the government made in nineteen forty two in Great Northern.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the petitioner’s opening argument in Marvin Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States?
0:00–6:20
2
How does the petitioner argue that the 1875 Act grants only an easement, not a fee interest?
6:20–13:52
3
Why does the petitioner cite the Great Northern case and claim it supports an easement interpretation?
13:52–21:06
4
What is the significance of Section 912 (and later statutes) to the government’s claim of a reversionary interest?
21:06–30:50
5
How might cities and municipalities be affected if the Court rules for the petitioner?
30:50–37:58
6
How many acres or miles of land could be at stake in this dispute?
37:58–47:07
7
What potential takings or compensation claims could arise from overturning the government’s position?
47:07–55:41
8
What is the petitioner’s final rebuttal and request for relief?
55:41–1:01:33