Marx v. General Revenue Corp. (11-1175)
argument 11-1175Marx v. General Revenue Corp.
Supreme Court of the United States
53 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the central dispute between Rule 54‑D and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act?
We'll hear argument next in case eleven eleven seventy five, Marx versus General Revenue Corporation. Is heavy?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Rule fifty four D provides a standard for an award of cost to a bailing party that by the rules expressed terms does not apply where federal statute provides otherwise. The Fair Dead Collection Practices Act provides otherwise because it states a different rule for awarding costs than than does Rule fifty four D. Whereas Rule fifty four D gives district courts wide discretion to award costs to prevailing defendants. The FTCPA limits courts' discretions to cases brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. The text of the Act provides that on a finding That an action was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, a court may award attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.
As a matter of grammar, the unmistakable meaning of that sentence is that an award of costs, like an award of attorneys' fees, is subject to the condition that the plaintiff's suit be brought to the under that provision. That's certainly true. You can't uh you can't get costs under that provision unless there has been that prerequisite. But w y it it's it's it's ancient law that uh that repeals by implication are not favoured. And what you're arguing here is that that provision effectively repeals. Another provision which allows costs in all cases. Whether or not there has been misbehaviour. Now why why is why is this an exception to our general rule? I I just don't This doesn't seem to me like a clear repealer.
Well, there's no need to consider repeal by implication in this case, Your Honor, because Rule fifty four D expressly states that its presumption does not apply the Federal Statute provides the same thing. assuming a conflict, you're saying either the statute applies or Rule fifty four D applies But the statute can be read to say We are describing one category of case. We are describing the worst case. The bad faith harassing plaintiff. And the statute deals with that category of person and no other. So if you're not a bad faith harassing plaintiff, but you nonetheless lost, then you're under fifty four D. Oh Your Honor, the if you look at rule at Section K A three as a whole, the two sentences together confirm that this is not a provision about bad faith plaintiffs.
That rather the provision is addressing both fees and costs to pro to plaintiffs and defendants. And if if the Congress merely wanted to um state in that second sentence that fees were available and didn't mean to say anything about costs to defendants, there would have been no reason for Congress to have put costs in that sentence. If well there are a number of reasons. One is symmetry, because I have costs in the part about um defendance. And the concern that, well, if we leave out costs for the bad faith harassing plaintiff, then it It may be assumed that they get only attorney's fees and not costs. So the statutes and and provisions like this maybe redundant. But One can see That a drafter might very well want to say, Well, we said we're dealing with the defendant costs.
You wanna put the same thing in with a blank. Uh well you made a few points and I'll try to address each of them. First, there there'd be no reason to include costs in the second sentence just because it was in the first sentence. Because the first and second sentence are are На паралле. The first sentence makes an award of costs mandatory and therefore it does do some work beyond fifty four D, it clearly has has a function in that sentence. Whereas the second sentence, the award, is subject to the May, that is that it's not mandatory that the court award them. And if if Congress was Uh Congress would have no need to be concerned that if it left costs out of the second sentence there would be some negative implication, because there are several statutes that mention fees without costs, and GRC has cited no instance in which a court has read a negative implication into that.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central dispute between Rule 54‑D and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act?
0:01–7:57
2
How does the Court interpret the “bad‑faith” and “harassment” requirements in the statute?
7:57–15:06
3
Why do the parties argue that the statutory language on fees and costs is redundant or superfluous?
15:06–23:39
4
What legislative history do the advocates cite to explain Congress’s intent behind the cost‑shifting provision?
23:39–30:00
5
How do the parties use policy arguments about consumer‑debtors and frivolous suits to support their positions?
30:00–35:34
6
What is the role of the specific‑governs‑general canon in resolving the conflict between the statute and Rule 54‑D?
35:34–41:33
7
How do the justices address whether the statute creates a new rule or merely reinforces existing fee‑shifting authority?
41:33–47:33
8
What conclusions does the Court reach about the applicability of costs to prevailing defendants under this law?
47:33–53:22