Maslenjak v. United States (16-309)
argument 16-309Maslenjak v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the statutory basis for stripping naturalized citizenship under 1425A?
We'll hear argument next this morning in case 16309, Maslanyak v. United States. Mr. Landau.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. It may please the Court. Section 1425A of the Federal Criminal Code authorizes the government to strip a naturalized American of citizenship if it was procured contrary to law. Our position in this case is simple. The words procured contrary to law require a causal link between the procurement of citizenship and the underlying violation of law. At the government's urging, the district court read such a causal link out of the statute, instructing the jury that it could convict if petitioner obtained United States citizenship and violated at least one law governing naturalization. The instructions didn't require the government to prove that the underlying violation of law had any effect whatsoever on the naturalization decision.
Even
assuming I bought your argument, that's a very broad statement, any effect whatsoever. How about a natural tendency to effect? Your Honor. Because you can never predict what will actually happen in the end. You can only talk about what might happen.
And we would be happy. What we asked for was a materiality standard, which I think is very much along the lines that Your Honor just suggested. What's amazing here, and I think what makes this case so extreme, we're really at one end of the spectrum. The district court specifically instructed the jury, and here I quote, even if you find that a false statement did not influence the decision to approve the defendant's naturalization, the government need only prove that one of the defendant's statements was false.
Well, but what Justice Sotomayor said, in essence, means sometimes causality is known only after the fact. You can have a statement that everyone thinks is immaterial, that's objectively immaterial, but it might have a causal connection at the end of
the day. Well, the government, if it wants to strip an American of citizenship, which is about the most grave thing it can do, probably short of taking away someone's
— I fully understand that. Right. But it is the idea of what's material and what's immaterial and what's a causal link and what is not, in a sense, can be understood and analyzed only after the
fact. Well, I think, Your Honor — The government has the burden — if it wants to show that the petitioner or the defendant procured citizenship contrary to law, the government has to show, at the very least, that — based on a false statement, that the false statement was material. Our basic submission
— material or not, but why isn't this obviously material? She lied about her husband's, what he was doing in Bosnia, right? She said he was trying to avoid military conscription when in fact he was in the service and in a unit that was committing atrocities. Under what circumstances would that be In material.
Your Honor, we would like a chance to argue the materiality question to a jury, which is the general decider of what is material under this Court's decision in Gauden. We did not have the chance, given prevailing Sixth Circuit law, which said there was no materiality, to contest this issue at trial. And we very much — I understand that.
What — They were given refugee status based on a well-founded fear of persecution where and for what reason? Well,
this is the crux of the dispute, Your Honor. The government's position was that it was based on the fear of persecution by the Serbs based on her husband's evasion of military service. Where? In Bosnia?
In Bosnia.
Yes. Yes. And so this is now — they're out of Bosnia. They're at their American embassy in Belgrade seeking refugee status. Right. And this was, in a sense, the heart of the dispute at trial. And in fact — This, I think, relates also to Justice Ginsburg's question. The jury sent a note, but what was the refugee status based on? We're a little bit confused because we see here a document that says that it was apparently based on ethnic persecution by the Muslims in Bosnia. So I think this is really the heart of the factual dispute on what was the refugee status based on.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the statutory basis for stripping naturalized citizenship under 1425A?
0:00–6:30
2
How does the government’s jury instruction define materiality and causation?
6:30–14:12
3
Why is the refugee‑status claim central to the factual dispute?
14:12–21:03
4
What role does the “good moral character” provision play in denaturalization?
21:03–27:46
5
How do the parties interpret the phrase “procured contrary to law”?
27:46–33:30
6
What is the difference between sections 1425A and 1425B in this case?
33:30–39:57
7
Does the statute require a causal link or merely a “purpose” requirement?
39:57–46:09
8
What constitutional concerns arise from allowing broad denaturalization powers?
46:09–59:38