Mata v. Lynch (14-185)

argument 14-185

Mata v. Lynch

Supreme Court of the United States 52 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the jurisdictional question the Court is being asked to resolve in Mata v. Lynch?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next in case fourteen one hundred and eighty five, Mata versus Lynch. Mr Fleming.

Paul D. Clement 0:06

Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The Court has been offered two ways to approach this case a short way and a long way. We believe we prevail under both, and I will address both, but I would start with the short way, which we think is the right way. This is a case about appellate jurisdiction. Trying to please Justice Kennedy. This is a case about appellate jurisdiction and specifically whether Congress has given the Courts of Appeals jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to reopen that would be timely through the application of equitable tolling. And that question is answered by Section twelve fifty two of the INA, which creates jurisdiction over denials of motion to reopen, as the Court confirmed in Kuchana.

Paul D. Clement 0:47

And it makes no distinction based on the grounds of the denial of the motion to reopen. In this case, the board denied Mr. Mata's motion as untimely. It ruled that equitable tolling was generally available, but that Mr. Mata was not entitled to it because it erroneously believed that his misdemeanor assault conviction qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude. That legal error was reviewable. It would have been reviewed in any other circuit. It should have been reviewed here. and the government agrees, and Mr Peterson as a micus And does not mount to any argument that that denial somehow does not fall within the jurisdictional grant of section four three.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg 1:21

Explain why I mean on the surface he beats up his girlfriend. Uh why that is not a crime involving moral churpretism as I had thought. that the the rest of this is a academic if the bottom line is he's committed a crime of moral Chapter T.

Paul D. Clement 1:43

Justice Ginsburg, first of all, that that is a question that the Fifth Circuit did not reach and we submit should have reached. But to answer the question, the BIA has a very developed jurisprudence regarding when assault crimes qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude. And it involves consideration of a number of factors. It involves not only the uh level of injury that was either intended or caused, but also the level of intent. And as the level of intent that is chargeable under the offense decreases from intentionality to say recklessness, then the level of bodily injury that is required has to concomitantly increase in order for it to constitute moral turpitude. In Texas The simple assault statute that Mr.

Paul D. Clement 2:22

Mada pled guilty under is not an aggravated assault statute. It can be charged based only on bodily injury, and that is defined in a purposefully broad way, as the Texas Court of Appeals has stated, to include even injury caused by relatively minor physical contact. So simple assault that can be charged under that provision is not turpitudinous. And that's what the board should have ruled, and that was the argument that was presented to the Fifth Circuit, but the Fifth Circuit determined that it did not have jurisdiction to decide. That is the issue we've asked this court to review. Of course, it does not need to go into the turpitudinous or not. quality of the offence under section uh twenty two zero one A one of the Texas Penal Code.

Paul D. Clement 3:04

Because this is a jurisdictional question, there is no need to go further to the issues that uh Mr Peterson is raising regarding whether there is equitable tolling as a matter of merits under uh the INA. We don't think it's necessary. We think the Fifth Circuit can address that if appropriate if it chooses to on remand.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg 3:21

Wouldn't the Fifth wouldn't the Fifth Circuit need to be I mean, the Fifth Circuit view was no equitable tolling period. This statute says ninety days. It has a couple of exceptions and that's it. So if we simply say you have jurisdiction the the answer would likely be, fine, you told us we have a jurisdiction, we think this ni limitation period has no give and the cave.

Paul D. Clement 3:48

Justice Ginsburg, we don't think that's what the Fifth Circuit did in this case or in any other. In this case, the Court specifically disavowed any ruling on the merits of the equitable tolling claim.