Mathena v. Malvo (18-217)
argument 18-217Mathena v. Malvo
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 2m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
official recording ↗
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What is the historical background of Lee Malvo’s case and why is it being reviewed now?
We'll hear argument next in Mathina versus Malvo.
Mr Haydn? Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Fifteen years ago, Lee Malvo was tried, convicted, and sentenced for his role in the D C sniper attacks. Almost a decade later, Malvo sought federal habeas relief, relying exclusively on the new rule announced by this court in Miller versus Alabama. But Miller's rule does not cover Malvo's case and the lower courts erred in holding otherwise. I'd like to make three points. One about Miller, one about Montgomery, and one about why this matters. First, If Miller's holding isn't concerned with mandatory sentences, much of this Court's language in Miller makes very little sense. Miller repeatedly stated its own holding in terms of mandatory sentences, and the Court's analysis specifically distinguished between mandatory and non mandatory states.
Second, Montgomery must be interpreted both in light of Miller and in light of the facts that were before the court. All of the defendants before the court in both Miller and Montgomery had received mandatory sentences. And this court should not lightly interpret a decision about retroactivity as having retroactively announced a new rule governing non mandatory census. Finally, the reason why habeas is so formal and restrictive is because habeas is extraordinarily costly. Malvo's victims were already required to endure one full trial and sentencing hearing more than a decade ago, and the court should not like lightly ask them to go through another, particularly given that the original sentencing fully complied with then controlling constitutional restrictions.
I waive the remainder of my two minutes. So turning to the first point about Miller, I I think it's just extremely hard, as Malvo's brief now clarifies, that he only sought habeas relief based on Miller. And if you look at Malvo's original habeas petition, it's on page eighty of believ p page eighty of the petition appendix, he doesn't just say that he's seeking relief based on Miller. He says he's seeking relief based on Miller's holding that mandatory life without parole. violates the Eighth Amendment. So I think even Malvo, when he originally sought habeas in this case, recognized the precise nature of Miller's holding, and I think it's extraordinarily hard to get away from that.
Mr. Haitins, can we back up a little and explain to me why? These sentences are not mandatory. I mean the jury had only two choices death or life. without parole. and nobody seemed to have appreciated at the time of Malvo's Convictions. That there was any discretion. And then uh the piece of information I'd like to have Has any Virginia judge ever reduced to juvenile life without parole. to life with parole or a term of years.
Justice Ginsburg, I am not aware of any Virginia judge ever reducing a juvenile life without parole sentence for a person convicted of capital murder, which was the offense that Malvo was convicted of. I I believe that it's factually true that I'm not aware of an example. There have been examples of Virginia courts considering whether to do so, although those long predate Malvo sent- I I acknowledge that those post-date Malvo sentence. To go to your question about what the jury was instructed, that is what the Jury was instructed. But Virginia law is extremely clear that the sentencer is not the jury. The sentencer is the judge. And under the Supreme Court of Virginia's holding in Jones II, which Malvo does not and cannot challenge, this trial judge had the authority to suspend the sentence as a matter of state law.
And not only had the authority to do it, but had the authority to do it at the time of Malvo's trial. That's the specific issue. that the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed in Jones, and I think that's a binding holding uh as a matter of fact. But did
the judge know he could? Given that there was no history of doing it. I think that's uh posi that's the position of the S G in this case. But more fundamentally. The Fourth Circuit concluded I quote them. Malville's youth in attendant circumstances were not considered
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the historical background of Lee Malvo’s case and why is it being reviewed now?
0:00–7:18
2
How does the Court’s Miller decision define the mandatory‑sentence rule for juvenile offenders?
7:18–15:47
3
What is the Montgomery case’s relationship to Miller and how does it affect retroactivity?
15:47–25:39
4
Why does the argument focus on whether Virginia’s sentencing scheme is mandatory or discretionary?
25:39–34:12
5
What procedural rights does Miller require and are they satisfied by a discretionary sentencing regime?
34:12–40:51
6
How does the retroactivity analysis under Teague impact Malvo’s habeas claim?
40:51–48:05
7
What evidence exists about Virginia judges’ ability to consider youth and suspend sentences?
48:05–55:35
8
What is the final position on whether the Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit’s ruling?
55:35–1:02:37