McCoy v. Louisiana (16-8255)

argument 16-8255

McCoy v. Louisiana

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 1m 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗
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What constitutional right does the Sixth Amendment guarantee to criminal defendants?

John G. Roberts 0:00
Your argument next in Case 16-8255, McCoy v.
Theodore B. Olson 0:04
Louisiana. Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, when a defendant maintains his innocence and insists on testing the prosecution on its burden of proof, the Constitution prohibits a trial court from permitting the defendant's own lawyer over the defendant's objection to to tell the jury that he is guilty. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a personal defense that belongs to the accused and whether to admit or contest guilt is the paradigmatic example of that personal defense, not only because it singularly affects the life and liberty of the accused, but also because making that decision requires weighing subjective aspirations and value judgments that are unique to every individual.
John G. Roberts 1:05
Suppose the charge is murder and the lawyer says, based on what I've looked, I think your best case is self-defense. And the defendant says, no, I didn't shoot the person. and the lawyer says, well, I think the evidence is going to show that you did, self-defense. If the lawyer goes ahead and presents that defense, does that fall under your theory? Mr. Chief
Theodore B. Olson 1:37
Justice, I think your question raises a question both of what defense counsel may constitutionally do and also what defense counsel may not constitutionally do. I'll also note first that your hypothetical argument in dramatic contrast to this case, involves at a minimum the shared objective of obtaining an acquittal on the charged crimes. But in addition, our position is that the one thing that counsel in that case and in no case may do is this isn't about what counsel can argue. It's not about what evidence can be introduced. It's that counsel may not stand up and affirmatively vouch, admit that his client is guilty. Now, your example — That was a
John G. Roberts 2:29
big wind-up. But my particular question is, obviously, when you say simply that my client shot the guy, that doesn't mean he's guilty. If he did it in self-defense, he's not guilty. And then the defense is it was self-defense.
Theodore B. Olson 2:43
That's right. So recognizing that that is not this case, our position is, and I think the framers — utterly would agree that if a defendant stands up and says, look, I did not shoot that guy, as Mr. McCoy said, I did not kill my own family members, and I do not want my lawyer standing up and telling the jury that I did, that is for the defendant.
John G. Roberts 3:10
Your position is not limited to the situation where the lawyer admits the client's guilt. It goes beyond that.
Theodore B. Olson 3:16
that's a hypothetical, and our position is that the framers, that the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, the meaning of the right to defend that the framers enshrine, that it is recognized in all common law jurisdictions, is that if the defendant contests and decides to put the prosecution to its proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to an element of the offense, particularly at the actus reus, The Constitution precludes the defense, his own lawyer, from telling the jury that he did it.
John G. Roberts 3:52
Any element of the offense.
Theodore B. Olson 3:53
Defenses
John G. Roberts 3:54
have a lot of, I mean, is venue an element of an offense sometimes?
Theodore B. Olson 4:01
Well, the most extreme hypothetical I can think of is defense. Was there a mailing in interstate commerce?
John G. Roberts 4:07
All right. Well,
Theodore B. Olson 4:07
that's a
John G. Roberts 4:08
good one. Is
Theodore B. Olson 4:10
that,
John G. Roberts 4:11
I mean,
Theodore B. Olson 4:11
the Hobbs
John G. Roberts 4:12
Act or something, did you cross state lines?
Theodore B. Olson 4:15
That's
John G. Roberts 4:15
an element of the offense. So if a lawyer says, look, it's obvious that you did cross state lines. You've got 48 witnesses. I'm not going to argue that you didn't cross state lines. And the person says that's an element of the defense. You have to say I didn't or withdraw. No, no, no,
Theodore B. Olson 4:30
no. You don't — the client doesn't get to decide what you will affirmatively say. The client can say, even if it's just an element of
John G. Roberts 4:40
the — Okay, so the lawyer gets up, look, they've got to prove these things. Crossing state lines, that's clearly proved, but we want to talk about these other things. So that violates this fundamental right?
Theodore B. Olson 4:51
Just so that you and I are very clear about this, we don't think that this case presents the question because this is a case in which — in which there was not an agreement on whether to pursue acquittal.

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