McCullen v. Coakley (12-1168)
argument 12-1168McCullen v. Coakley
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What constitutional principle does the Court consider when evaluating public sidewalks for free speech?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case twelve eleven sixty eight, McCullen versus Cokley. Mr. Rienzi.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. This Court has held that the public sidewalks are a natural and proper place for free citizens to exchange information and ideas. For that reason the Court has held that public sidewalks occupy a special position in First Amendment analysis. Yet the Massachusetts law at issue here makes it a crime to enter onto certain public sidewalks, even for the purpose of peaceful conversation or leafleting. The law applies at abortion clinics throughout the state. on every hour of every day that they are open, regardless of the circumstances. Massachusetts asked this court to uphold that statute under the time, place and manner test. But the law fails each aspect of that test.
I would like to begin with narrow tailoring. The state says the law is necessary to protect its interests in pre preventing obstruction and congestion. But the law is not narrowly tailored to that to those interests for three reasons. First, the law applies regardless of whether there is any threat of obstruction or congestion at all. even when the sidewalks are entirely open and empty. For example, Mrs McCullen generally does her counselling early in the morning on Tuesdays and Wednesdays beginning at seven o'clock in the morning. She testified that she is sometimes alone when she does this counselling. Nancy Clark testified that ninety percent of the time that she is at the clinic in Worcester She is all alone.
A statute that makes it illegal for Mrs. McCullough or Mrs. Clark to engage in peaceful, consensual conversation on a public sidewalk. uh for fear of obstruction and congestion is not narrowly tailored.
Mr. Rianzi the the problem that the state faced is it doesn't know and it it has a history. It was a considerable history. of disturbances. Of blocking the entrance. And it doesn't know in advance who are the well behaved people and who are The people who won't behave well. So and after the disturbance occurs it's it's too late. So the state is trying to say We want to make sure that the entrance is not blocked. And the only way we can do that is to have a rule that applies to everyone. We can't we can't screen people to know who will be well behaved and who will be disruptive.
So I think the state is simply wrong about that fact for several reasons. There are many tools that the state either has in its current toolbox or could enact that would deal with that concern. If I may back up for a second, I think there are really two different interests that the State asserts when it makes that argument, Justice Ginsburg. First, they say that there are actual deliberate bad actors. There are some people whom the State claims have deliberately violated the law and blocked the door and interfered with access. And then secondly, the state says there's also some circumstances where there are enough people on the sidewalk that even lawful, consensual conversation might accidentally block a door.
Uh I think those are actually two quite different interests, but there are tools in the toolbox to deal with both of them. For example, Section E of this statute makes it illegal to impede, block, obstruct, or even hinder somebody's access to the clinics. And that section of the statute is not challenged here, never has been.
When uh d do you n uh I should probably ask this uh of the other side and I will, but do you happen to know When was the last time? uh that Massachusetts uh prosecuted somebody for obstructing entrance to an abortion clinic.
So I believe uh the the last site in the record that I'm aware of is as of nineteen ninety seven, there was a decision in a previous injunction case against people who had been adjudicated to have broken rules. Um there's a nineteen ninety seven case on that. To my knowledge, they have never brought a case, for example, under the federal face law, which has been in existence for twenty years. So
so there there there have been laws against obstruction during this entire period, right?
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What constitutional principle does the Court consider when evaluating public sidewalks for free speech?
0:01–7:48
2
How does the petitioner argue that Massachusetts’ buffer‑zone law fails the narrow‑tailoring test?
7:48–16:32
3
What evidence is presented about actual obstruction and congestion at abortion clinics?
16:32–23:37
4
Why does the petitioner claim the state’s 35‑foot buffer zone is overbroad compared to available alternatives?
23:37–30:23
5
How do the parties discuss the distinction between peaceful counseling and disruptive protest?
30:23–38:50
6
What precedents (e.g., Madsen, Hill, Heffron) are cited to evaluate the statute’s constitutionality?
38:50–46:50
7
How does the government justify the statute by pointing to historical violence and lack of effective tools?
46:50–54:43
8
What is the final request to the Court regarding the strict‑scrutiny analysis of the buffer‑zone law?
54:43–59:52