McIntosh v. United States (22-7386)
argument 22-7386McIntosh v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
48 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 8 days ago
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Transcript
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What is Rule 32.2 B and why does it require a preliminary forfeiture order before sentencing?
We will hear argument first this morning, case twenty two seven three eight six, Macintosh
versus United States. Mr. Yeowitz. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Rule thirty two point two B states in unequivocal terms that a a district court must enter a preliminary order of forfeiture prior to sentencing. In this case, no one disputes no such order was entered, and there is also no dispute why not, as the Second Circuit found because the government did not submit one. Indeed, none was entered until three years after sentencing. Petitioner contends that Rule thirty two point two B is a mandatory claims processing rule, and the failure To enter the preliminary order of forfeiture is fatal to the government's ability to seek forfeiture. Such a reading is consistent with the plain language of the rule, its structure, and purpose.
The plain language requires entry of a preliminary order prior to sentencing. This court has never interpreted the term must to mean a mere time-related directive. Such an interpretation is also consistent with the rule's comprehensive structure, pursuant to which forfeiture must be addressed. Those directives start from the beginning of the case, continue through verdict, then prior to sentencing, at sentencing, and after sentencing. This highly calibrated structure confirms the mandatory nature of the need. to enter the preliminary order of ferventure. The purpose of Rule 32.2B's requirement to enter the preliminary order prior to sentencing also reflects the goal of procedural due process and finality, all of which are indicative of a prophylactive mandatory claim processing rule.
Finally, Rule 32.2B's requirement to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture is nothing like those rules which this court Court has held were mere time-related directives. Those cases involved either administrative rules and the concern of imposing mandatory conditions on bureaucratic agencies or rules designed to protect third parties, not before the courts, such as the victims in Dolan and the public in Montava Murillo. This court should conclude that Rule 32.2B is a mandatory claim processing rule. rule. I invite the court's questions.
Uh but didn't your client didn't uh petitioner have actual notice uh that the government was going to uh seek forfeiture?
He had notice in the in the indictment in the Bill of Particulars for but from that point on the government was silent. There was no notice. The government provided no indication after verdict that it was going to be seeking forfeiture until literally the eleventh hour, fifty-ninth minute, where the court said it was about to impose sentence.
So how exactly was he uh prejudiced uh by what the government did here?
He was prejudiced by a loss of value in the car, and there are third party rights, third party claimants that are also prejudiced, because until a preliminary order of forfeiture is entered, N third party claimants cannot Uh litigate their rights.
Were there any third party claimants though?
The car was titled in his mother's name. She w pre presumably would have been a third party claimant. And she she didn't get I I my understanding she didn't even get notice.
Uh how does the harmless air rule apply here? I mean n I I understand y you've just indicated to uh Justice Thomas that your client is prejudiced, but does a court have an obligation to assess the harmlessness of of this rule violation? Rule fifty two would normally require that.
So nur uh Doland set uh set forth three potential uh uh rules for The to three potential buckets, a jurisdictional rule, a uh a mandatory claim processing rule, and a time related directive. Uh, I'm sorry,
just to orient the discussion a little more precisely. We're dealing here with the federal rules of criminal procedure, which have a harmless error rule built into them and say that they apply with respect to all of the other rules. So what about that?
So i it i th this e even in this court in Ebar, when it was construing Rule thirty three, it didn't look to a harmless error rule because it h held that it was a mandatory claim processing rule.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is Rule 32.2 B and why does it require a preliminary forfeiture order before sentencing?
0:00–6:15
2
How does the petitioner argue that the rule is a mandatory claims‑processing requirement?
6:15–12:22
3
What prejudice does the petitioner claim resulted from the government’s failure to give notice?
12:22–18:02
4
How do the justices apply the harmless‑error analysis to Rule 32.2 B violations?
18:02–22:37
5
Why do the parties debate whether the rule is a jurisdictional deadline or a mandatory claim‑processing rule?
22:37–28:55
6
What remedy does the petitioner seek if the preliminary order was omitted—remand, vacatur, or new forfeiture order?
28:55–34:18
7
How do prior cases like Dolan, Gonzalez v. Thaler, and Montalvo Marillo inform the Court’s approach?
34:18–41:12
8
What is the Court’s final position on the error and its impact on the forfeiture judgment?
41:12–48:55