McKinney v. Arizona (18-1109)
argument 18-1109McKinney v. Arizona
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What is the State’s argument for seeking the death penalty against James McKinney?
We'll hear argument next in Case 181109, McKinney v. Arizona. Mr. Cotillo?
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The State seeks to put James McKinney to death, even though he's never once had a sentencing proceeding that complies with current law. There are two separate paths for McKinney to win. The path in question one argues that the Arizona Supreme Court reopened McKinney's sentencing proceeding. The Ninth Circuit had earlier granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus and gave the State the option of either imposing a life sentence or seeking the death penalty again. The State chose the latter. which required brand-new state action in the form of new sentencing. The Arizona Supreme Court then did everything itself, just as it had in 1996. That was wrong.
This Court's decisions in Ring and Hearst required a jury sentencing. If McKinney were sentenced today, no one doubts he'd be entitled to a jury trial. The State claims this would open the floodgates, but McKinney is not seeking to use Ring retroactively. as a sword to challenge his earlier proceedings. Rather, he's saying that when the state conducts a new proceeding, that sentencing must comply with current law. Otherwise, the implications would be frightening. For example, a state could run a resentencing today in 2019 with a pre-Batson jury with race-based jury strikes. That can't be right. And the second path set out in question two is for this court to simply say that the Eddings violation in this case
requires a remand to the trial court for sentencing and that the appellate court was wrong to perform that delicate task itself. This breaks no new ground. Indeed, this Court has, on five separate occasions since the 1982 Eddings decision, ordered resentencing for Eddings violations. Both paths get McKinney to the same destination, but they are separate. Question two is limited to the small universe of Eddings violations and how to fix them. And question one, by contrast, is about when sentencing proceedings lose their finality and are reopened. I'm fine waving the rest of my time.
Well, what about Clemens? Because Clemens is a president of this court that says that the appellate court can do re-weighing. Is that still good law?
So we're on question two, and with respect to question two, Clemens is not an Eddings case at all. Clemens is a case about whether or not an aggravating circumstance can be subtracted in a resentencing proceeding. That's a much easier case than what the— Right.
You say in your brief, erroneously including an invalid aggravating circumstance is fundamentally different from erroneously excluding a relevant mitigating circumstance. Why? I don't understand
that. Because what the Arizona Supreme Court task had to deal with here was a full-blown reweighing of everything, mitigating and aggravating circumstances, whereas subtracting one element is very different. And, indeed, we know this from Clemens itself, Justice Kavanaugh, because the very end of Clemens — actually brackets this case. It says, in a circumstance in which the appellate court is asked for the first time to weigh and determine evidence, that's different. In what case do they cite there? They cite this Court's decision in Caldwell. And in Caldwell, There's language after language saying appellate courts are ill-suited to making these determinations about a defendant and whether mercy should be given.
They want to see the defendant in person. That's a lot of
the argument that Justice Blackmun raised in dissent in Clemens, of course, that the appellate court wasn't well-suited to do this, that this was really a mistake.
Correct. And our point to you is twofold. Number one, you can just take Clemens as existing law. I do think it's – my second point is it's undercut by Ring and Hearst, but just it may be existing law, but it's only existing law with respect to the subtraction of one aggravating circumstance.
How do the two legal paths (question 1 and question 2) differ in McKinney’s case?
And Clemens itself, as I say, brackets this. And then the second thing is this Court, I think, has really changed the rules since Clemens was
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the State’s argument for seeking the death penalty against James McKinney?
0:00–3:51
2
How do the two legal paths (question 1 and question 2) differ in McKinney’s case?
3:51–9:58
3
Why does the petition argue that the Arizona Supreme Court’s resentencing violates Ring and Hearst?
9:58–15:41
4
What is the significance of the Clemens decision for this case’s second path?
15:41–21:30
5
How do the parties define “new proceeding” versus “re‑opening” of sentencing?
21:30–29:02
6
When does a collateral proceeding become a direct review under federal law?
29:02–36:11
7
Does the retroactive application of Ring require a new jury sentencing for McKinney?
36:11–50:20
8
What procedural outcome does the Court seek—remand, vacatur, or affirmation?
50:20–59:22